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It is as Bolsheviks that the Jews of South Russia have been massacred 
by the armies of [the Ukrainian leader Simon] Petliura, though the 
armies of Sokolov have massacred them as partisans of Petliura, the 
armies of Makhno as bourgeois capitalists, the armies of Gregoriev 
as Communists, and the armies of Denikin at once as Bolsheviks, 
capitalists, and Ukrainian nationalists. It is Aesop’s old fable.
Israel Zangwill, Jewish Chronicle, 23 January 1920
The pogroms in Ukraine between 1917 and 1921 represent the largest 
and bloodiest anti-Jewish massacres prior to the Holocaust. The 
estimated number of Jews murdered in Ukraine in the aftermaths of 
World War I ranges from 50,000 to 200,000,1 with many more Jews 
suffering violence, rape,2 and loss of property. Altogether 1.6 million 
Jews were affected by these violent events. Although it is impossible 
to determine the exact number of victims of these pogroms, there is 
no doubt that this was the largest outbreak of anti-Jewish violence 
before the Shoah, the genocide during World War II in which 6 
million European Jews, around two-thirds of the Jewish population 
of the continent, were systematically murdered by the Nazis and their 
collaborators. 
1  The early pogrom researcher Nokhem Gergel estimated 50,000 to 60,000 victims. 
See Nokhem Gergel, “The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918–21,” Yivo Annual of 
Jewish Science 6 (1951), 237–52 (p. 249).
2  On this topic see Irina Astashkevich, Gendered Violence: Jewish Women in the Pogroms 
of 1917 to 1921 (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018), http://www.oapen.org/dow
nload?type=document&docid=1001750
© 2019 Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0176.01
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Being overshadowed by the Holocaust, the pogroms in Ukraine 
are still not widely known. This unfortunate state of affairs is due to a 
number of factors. Firstly, the complex nature of the anti-Semitic violence 
perpetrated in 1917–1921 Ukraine. As hinted in Zangwill’s quote above, 
the Jews were attacked by a number of different groups of perpetrators 
including Anton Denikin’s Russian White Army, Simon Petliura’s Army 
of the Ukrainian Republic, various peasant units, hoodlums, anarchists, 
and the Bolshevik Red Army. 
These attacks stemmed from a number of grievances: accusations of 
supporting the enemy side, the chaos following the collapse of the old 
order, the aftermath of World War I and of the Russian Revolution, and 
a widespread anti-Semitism, after the dissolution of the Russian and 
Habsburg Empire. Furthermore, the perpetrators could easily locate 
their victims, as the areas affected were situated within the old Pale of 
Settlement, a region designated for Jews within today’s Poland, Russia, 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Moldova.3 
The relative lack of research on these events provides a further 
explanation of why the Ukrainian pogroms are much less known than 
the persecution the Jews suffered at the hand of the Nazis and other 
perpetrators during the Shoah. If, over the last 70 years, research on the 
Holocaust has resulted in several thousand publications, which can be 
housed only in the library of a large institute such as the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, the publications relating to the pogroms 
of 1917−1921 would fill no more than two or three shelves. It is however 
hoped that the anti-Semitic campaigns taking place in early-twentieth-
century Ukraine will in the future be recognized as an important chapter 
in the history of genocide studies. 
Among the many perpetrators of the pogroms, it was Petliura who 
became the symbol of these massacres. Scholars have long debated 
whether Petliura was an anti-Semite who deliberately targeted the Jews, 
or a weak leader who could not stop their aggressors. Some answers 
3  The Pale of Settlement was originally formed in 1791 by Russia’s Catherine II. 
For political, economic, and religious reasons, very few Jews were allowed to live 
elsewhere. At the end of the nineteenth century, close to 95 percent of the 5.3 million 
Jews in the Russian Empire lived in the Pale of Settlement. In early 1917, the Pale 
of Settlement was abolished, permitting Jews to live where they wished in the 
former Russian Empire. This region continued to be a center of Jewish communal 
life until World War II. YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, https://www.
facinghistory.org/resource-library/image/pale-settlement
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to this complex question were put forward two decades ago by Henry 
Abramson, and more recently by Antony Polonsky and Christopher 
Gilley.4 These scholars maintained that although Petliura’s soldiers 
were responsible for the death of about forty percent of the victims, 
their commander’s own behavior during the pogroms was ambivalent. 
On the one hand, Petliura seems not to have held anti-Semitic views 
and he did not personally issue orders to kill the Jews. On the other, he 
did very little to stop the massacres, particularly between January and 
April 1919, the period of the most brutal persecutions, even though the 
Ministry of Jewish Affairs urged him to do so. As Christopher Gilley 
writes, ‘Petliura lacked the responsibility of agency for the pogroms, but 
as head of the army [he] must be held accountable for them.’5 
Nevertheless, Petliura began to be seen as the main perpetrator of 
the pogroms only after his assassination on 25 May 1926 in Paris by 
Sholom Shwartzbard, a Russian-born French Yiddish poet of Jewish 
descent who had been in Ukraine during the massacres. The French 
court acquitted Schwartzbard, recognizing that he avenged the victims 
of Petliura’s troops. This verdict enraged the Ukrainian nationalists who 
from now on claimed that Schwartzbard was a Bolshevik (or a Russian 
agent) who killed Petliura because he fought for an independent 
Ukraine. Interestingly Ukrainian nationalists had initially disliked 
Petliura due to his alliance with Józef Piłsudski in 1920. However, this 
view changed after his assassination, which, in their eyes, transformed 
Petliura into a hero who fought and died for an independent Ukraine. 
As Dmytro Dontsov, one of the leading radical Ukrainian nationalists, 
wrote after the trial: 
This murder is an act of revenge by an agent of Russian imperialism 
against a person who became a symbol of the national struggle against 
Russian oppression. It does not matter that in this case a Jew became an 
4  Henry Abramson, A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary 
Times, 1917–1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Ukrainian Research 
Institute and Center for Jewish Studies, 1999); Antony Polonsky, The Jews in Poland 
and Russia, 1914‒2008 (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010), 
III, 32–43; Christopher Gilley, ‘Beyond Petliura: The Ukrainian National Movement 
and the 1919 Pogroms’, East European Jewish Affairs 47.1 (2017), 45–61. 
5  Gilley, ‘Beyond Petliura’, p. 47. See also Serhii Iekelchyk, ‘Trahichna storinka 
Ukrains’koi revoliutsii: Symon Petliura ta Ievreis’ki pogrom v Ukraini (1917–1920)’, 
in Vasyl Mykhal’chuk (ed.), Symon Petliura ta ukrains’ka natsional’na revoliutsiia 
(Kyiv: Rada, 1995), pp. 165–217.
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agent of Russian imperialism. […] We have to and we will fight against 
the aspiration of Jewry to play the inappropriate role of lords in Ukraine. 
[…] No other government took as many Jews into its service as did 
the Bolsheviks, and one might expect that like Pilate the Russians will 
wash their hands and say to the oppressed nations, ‘The Jew is guilty of 
everything’.6
Petliura continued to be glorified by nationalists well after his death. 
During the pogroms perpetrated by the Nazis and the Ukrainian 
nationalists in Lviv, the capital of western Ukraine, in the summer of 
1941, the perpetrators staged the ‘Petliura days’ in his honor. After 
the main wave of pogroms in late June and early July 1941 came to an 
end, on 25 July 1941 the local nationalists organized with the Germans 
additional three days of pogroms to ‘avenge’ Petliura’s assassination.7 
During the Cold War the Ukrainian diaspora celebrated him next to 
other national ‘heroes’ such as Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych. 
Moreover Ukrainian nationalist historians such as Taras Hunczak 
portrayed Petliura as a Judeophile who actively opposed the 
pogromists. Notwithstanding Petliura’s responsibility for the pogroms, 
this revisionist approach is alive to this day — the one-time commander 
of the Army of the Ukrainian Republic is still hailed as a symbol of anti-
Semitism and a ‘national hero’. A monument to Petliura was unveiled 
in Vinnytsia in 2017.8
In contrast to Petliura, Anton Denikin did not become the symbol 
of the pogroms, although the massacres committed by his army were 
generally known. One important reason why he has not been associated 
with the anti-Semitic violence in Ukraine is his unspectacular life after 
the end of the Russian Civil War. When the Red Army defeated the 
White Army, he escaped with the rest of his soldiers to Crimea. In April 
1920, he left to Constantinople and then to London. From 1926, he lived 
in France but he did not engage in politics, focusing on writing. The 
crimes committed by his army have not been forgotten but they were 
6  Dmytro Dontsov, ‘Symon Petliura’, Literaturno Naukoyi Vistnyk 7–8:5 (1926), 326–28.
7  Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian 
Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2014). On the pogroms in 
Ukraine in general, see Kai Struve, Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, 
antijüdische Gewalt: Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015).
8  Taras Hunczak, ‘A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian–Jewish Relations, 
1917–1921’, Jewish Social Studies 31:3 (1969), 163–83.
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neither investigated as thoroughly as the massacres done by the Petliura 
army nor did they arouse any major controversies, because none tried to 
systematically or deliberately deny them as the Ukrainian nationalists 
did in the case of Petliura’s soldiers. 
In order to understand the nature of the anti-Jewish violence between 
1918 and 1921 in Ukraine, we need critical and nuanced studies instead 
of monuments and cults. A key source for further research into these 
massacres are the survivor accounts and early publications written 
by the survivors soon after the events. Nokhem Shtif’s The Pogroms in 
Ukraine: The Period of the Volunteer Army is one such study. Shtif’s book 
can be compared to the works published by the members of the Jewish 
Historical Commission, which was created in 1944 by survivors of the 
Shoah in liberated Poland. This group of young Jews collected several 
thousand survivor testimonies and published important early studies 
on the Holocaust.9 
Shtif, a linguist, writer and journalist, was the editor-in-chief of the 
Editorial Committee for the Collection and Publication of Documents 
on the Ukrainian Pogroms, which was founded in Kiev in May 1919. 
He collected the material during the pogroms and published his 
book in Berlin in 1923. His study stands alongside Nokhem Gergel’s 
The Pogroms in Ukraine in the Years 1918–1921 and Elias Tcherikover’s 
Antisemitism and the Pogroms in Ukraine: The Period of the Central Rada and 
the Hetman, 1917–1918, one of the most important early publications on 
the topic.10 Unlike other authors, Shtif did not focus on Petliura and his 
troops but on Denikin’s White Army. A particularly perceptive study 
of the violence inflicted on the Ukrainian Jews and its perpetrators, 
The Pogroms in Ukraine, 1918–19: Prelude to the Holocaust fills the gaps in 
our understanding of the largest massacres before the Holocaust. This 
translation from the Yiddish published in Open Access finally makes 
this important study accessible to scholars, students and the wider 
readership. 
9  Laura Jockusch, Collect and Record!: Jewish Holocaust Documentation in Early Postwar 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
10  Nokhem Gergel, ‘The Pogroms in Ukraine in the Years 1918–1921’, in Shriftn far 
ekonomik un statistic, I, 1928, English translation in YIVO Annual of Jewish Social 
Science (New York: Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, 1951), pp. 237–52; Elias 
Tcherikower, Antisemitizm un pogromen in Ukraine, 1917–1918: tsu der geshikhte fun 
































































The signing of the armistice formally ending World War I did not end the 
bloodbath in Ukraine, which continued to be ravaged by the Civil War 
between the Soviet regime and the ‘Whites’, by Polish attempts to seize 
the former Austrian province of Galicia, and by Ukraine’s campaign to 
maintain its independence from both Poland and the USSR. Organized 
armies, partisan units, and peasant gangs — with political objectives 
that were at times opposing and at times overlapping — devastated 
the land. As is often the case, unarmed civilians bore the brunt of 
the suffering. These military forces — the Ukrainian National Army 
headed by Symon Vasylyovych Petliura,1 the Tsarist Volunteer Army2 
of Anton Ivanovich Denikin,3 the Army of the Second Polish Republic, 
the gangs of such leaders as Nestor Makhno4 and Nikifor Grigoriev,5 
and the Bolshevik Army — were guilty of specifically targeting Jewish 
communities. 
1  Symon Petliura: Supreme Commander of the Army of the Ukrainian National 
Republic that was established in 1917, and head of the Directorate formed in 1918.
2  The Dobrovolcheskaya Armiya was organized in late 1917 by Gen. Mikhail Alekseyev 
and Gen. Lavr Kornilov to oppose the Bolsheviks. 
3  Anton Denikin: A general in the Russian White Army fighting the Bolsheviks in 
the Russian Civil War, who took command of the Volunteer Army in April 1918, 
fighting mostly in Ukraine.
4  Nestor Makhno: Leader of anarchist revolutionary groups sometimes allied with 
the Red Army, sometimes with the Whites.
5  Nikifor Grigoriev: Nickname of Nychipir Servetmik, self-styled ataman, who first 
served in the Russian army, then led military groups allied variously with Petliura, 
Makhno, and others.
© 2019 Maurice Wolfthal, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0176.02
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Scholarly estimates of the number of Jews killed, wounded, or tortured 
range between 100,000 and 120,000. William Henry Chamberlin6 cites 
Sergei Gusev-Orenburgsky, who calculated that ‘no fewer than 100,000 
people perished.’7 Hundreds of Jewish communities were burned to the 
ground. Zvi Y. Gitelman estimates that more than 1,200 pogroms were 
committed in Ukraine in 1918 and 1919.8 The homeless numbered in the 
hundreds of thousands, including thousands of orphans living on the 
streets, rummaging for food, begging and stealing. 
Working from large documentation that had been collected in 
Kiev and brought to Berlin, Nokhem Gergel published ‘Di pogromen 
in Ukrayne in di yorn 1918–1921’ in 1928,9 in which he conservatively 
estimated the total number of murdered and maimed in those three 
years at 100,000. He also reported the horrific mass rapes of Jewish 
women and girls during these pogroms in Ukraine, noting several 
thousand documented cases, but indicating that there were probably 
many more, because ‘The victims took pains to conceal their disgrace.’10
A number of local and international relief organizations struggled 
to provide the pogrom survivors with food, lodging, and medical care. 
The situation was desperate not only for those who had been maimed, 
blinded, or raped, but also those who were falling prey to deadly 
epidemics. In the course of their work, some of the Jewish agencies 
attempted to document the atrocities to encourage donations for their 
relief work and to mobilize world public opinion against the pogroms. 
To that end, they contacted news agencies and diplomats, especially 
those of the Western powers that were supporting the ‘White’ anti-
Bolshevik armies with funding and weapons. 
In what was one of the earliest efforts to systematically record human 
rights atrocities on a mass scale, the Central Committee for the Assistance 
of Pogrom Victims in Kiev combined the efforts of three relief agencies 
into a single Redaktions-kolegye oyf zamlen un oysforshn di materialn vegn 
6  William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917–1921 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1954), II, p. 240.
7  Kniga o evreiskikh pogromakh na Ukraine v 1919 g. (Petrograd: Ispolneno izd-vom Z.I. 
Grzhebina, 192–?), p. 14.
8  Zvi Y. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1972), p. 161.
9  Nokhem Gergel, ‘The Pogroms in Ukraine in the Years 1918–1921’, in Shriftn far 
ekonomik un statistic, I, 1928, English translation in YIVO Annual of Jewish Social 
Science (New York: Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, 1951), pp. 237–52.
10  Ibid., p. 252.
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di pogromen in Ukrayne,11 composed of prominent Ukrainian Jews, with 
the scholars Nokhem Shtif and Elias (Elye) Tcherikover at the helm. The 
Editorial Board also added documentation that had been collected by 
other organizations, like the All-Ukrainian Relief Committee for the 
Victims of Pogroms under the auspices of the Red Cross. 
But in 1920 and 1921 the Bolsheviks in Kiev began to suppress other 
political parties, including the Yidishe folks-partey12 and its publishing 
house, the Folks-farlag.13 This impelled Dubnow, a founder of the party, 
Shtif, Tcherikover, and other folkists who had compiled the archive to 
leave Kiev. They eventually made their way to Berlin, by way of Kaunas, 
Minsk, or Moscow, and brought the documents with them. 
This was now known in English as the Eastern Jewish Historical 
Archive, in German as the Ostjüdisches Historisches Archiv, and in Yiddish 
as the Mizrekh-yidisher historisher arkhiv. The documentation was so large 
that a multi-volume series was planned for publication. The Board itself 
published only two volumes. Tcherikover’s 1923 Antisemitism and the 
Pogroms in Ukraine: The Period of the Central Rada and the Hetman, 1917–
1918 came out in Yiddish and Russian.14 Joseph B. Schechtman’s The 
Pogroms of the Volunteer Army in Ukraine appeared later, in Russian and 
German,15 in 1932. A second book by Tcherikover was only published in 
1965. Nokhem Shtif researched the archive materials to write The Pogroms 
in Ukraine: The Period of the Volunteer Army in 1920, and published it in 
1923 in Berlin with Verlag Wostok, in Yiddish and Russian. Tcherikover 
and Shtif deliberately published their works in Yiddish both to reach 
a Yiddish-reading audience and to signal the arrival of Yiddish as a 
serious academic language. 
The archive received worldwide attention in a sensational trial a 
few years later. Sholem-Shmuel Schwarzbard was a young Jewish 
watchmaker from Balta who survived the 1905 pogrom. Drawn to 
11  Yiddish: Editorial Board for the Collection and Investigation of Materials 
Concerning Pogroms in Ukraine.
12  Yiddish: Jewish People’s Party, founded in 1906 by the historian Simon Dubnow and 
Yisroel Efroykin, was dedicated to the achievement of full civil and political rights 
for the Jews of the Russian empire. Its supporters saw it as a more realistic response 
to European anti-Semitism than the possibility of a Jewish state in Palestine.
13  Yiddish: People’s Publisher.
14  Elias Tcherikover, Antisemitizm un pogromen in Ukraine, 1917–1918 (Berlin: Yidisher 
literarisher ferlag, 1923). 
15  Joseph B. Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovolcheskoi Armii na Ukraine (Berlin: Ostjüdisches 
Historisches Archiv, 1932).
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radical politics, he served time in prison due to his activities. He left 
Ukraine for the neighboring provinces of Austria-Hungary, where 
he worked as a watchmaker but continued to move in Socialist and 
Anarchist circles. He was arrested in Vienna and Budapest for robbery, 
left for Switzerland and then moved to Paris. Schwarzbard enlisted 
with his brother in the French Foreign Legion, then fought in the French 
Army in World War I. He was shot through the lung and was left with 
only one good arm, and was decorated for heroism with the Croix de 
Guerre. After his discharge he traveled back to Russia, where he joined 
a unit of Red Guards in Petrograd, then an Anarchist unit in Odessa. 
In 1919, when Schwarzbard saw the atrocities being perpetrated in 
pogroms by the ‘Whites’, he enlisted in an ‘International Brigade’ to 
fight against the forces of Petliura and Denikin. But his unit was routed, 
and he eventually managed to make his way back to Paris. 
In 1926 Schwarzbard learned that Petliura, now the head of the 
Ukrainian government in exile, was living in Paris. He followed him 
and assassinated him. Arrested and charged with murder, Schwarzbard 
took full responsibility for killing Petliura to avenge the thousands of 
pogrom victims. There was a long, tumultuous trial, and Tcherikover, 
who was now Director of the History Section of the YIVO,16 testified 
for the defense,17 marshaling the harrowing atrocities that the Editorial 
Board had documented. The names were read aloud of fourteen 
of Schwarzbard’s family members who had been murdered in the 
pogroms. Schwarzbard was acquitted.
Shtif’s book The Pogroms in Ukraine: the Period of the Volunteer Army 
illuminates the Schwarzbard trial. Petliura’s supporters made much of 
the fact that Schwarzbard was Jewish and had served in the Bolshevik 
Army. Shtif concludes that the primary cause of the Denikin pogroms 
was the anti-Semitism of the Volunteer Army officers, all of whom 
were Tsarists. He notes that during World War I, the Tsarist regime had 
already falsely accused the Jews of espionage and of betraying Russia 
to the Germans. Hundreds of thousands of Jews had been deported into 
the Russian interior on suspicion of treason, far from their villages and 
16  Yiddish acronym for Yidisher visenshaftlekher institut [Jewish Scientific Institute], 
founded in 1925. Its prime mover had been Nokhem Shtif. It is now in New York, 
known as the Institute for Jewish Research.
17  Simon Dubnow also attended the trial.
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towns near the front lines. Even earlier, Russians loyal to the monarchy 
had alleged that Jews were conspiring to bring the Bolsheviks to power. 
On top of the vicious stereotype of Jews as rich and greedy, there was 
now the canard that Jews were Communists. A common refrain was 
‘Kill the Jews and save Russia!’
Shtif pinpoints the anti-Semitic vitriol of the two ideologues of 
the Volunteer Army, Vasiliy Vitalyevich Shulgin and Konstantin 
Nikolayevich Sokolov. Shulgin had been a member of the last 
Russian Duma and a leader of the Black Hundreds,18 and was editor-
in-chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper, Kievlyanin. Sokolov had 
helped write the Constitution of the Volunteer Army and was head 
of Denikin’s propaganda department, Osvag.19 Both of them promoted 
paranoid delusions about an imaginary Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy. 
In the 1920s and 1930s those same delusions were to permeate Nazi 
pathology and helped pave the way to the Holocaust. They continued 
to fuel pogroms even after the end of World War II, and they persist in 
some quarters today.
Shtif had been named on the Editorial Board because he was a 
leading Jewish intellectual and activist. Raised in a Yiddish-speaking 
home, he had received a traditional religious education from private 
tutors, and then attended the Real-Gymnazium as a teenager in Rovno. He 
immersed himself in the study of Hebrew. He later studied engineering 
and chemistry at the Kiev Polytekhnikum and became active in Socialist 
and Zionist causes. In 1902 he attended the Zionist conference in Minsk.
The bloody pogrom at Kishinev in 1903 prompted Shtif to join a 
Jewish self-defense unit in Kiev. He helped start the Vozrozhdenie20 
movement, which later evolved into the Sejimist Party.21 He was jailed for 
his political activities and went into exile in Switzerland, where he was 
influenced by the thinking of Chaim Zhitlowsky, Yiddishist, advocate 
of Jewish Territorialism, and founder of the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party. Shtif began to contribute numerous articles and literary reviews 
18  Russian: Chornaya sotnya. A violent ultranationalist, tsarist organization that called 
for the expulsion of Jews from Russia and for the suppression of Ukrainian political 
and cultural rights.
19  Russian acronym for Osvedomitel’noe-agitatsionnoe otdelenie [Propaganda and 
Information Department].
20  Russian: Renaissance.
21  Also known as the Jewish Socialist Labor Party. 
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to Yevreyskaya Zhizn,22 Dos naye lebn,23 Di folksshtime,24 Der fraynd,25 and 
other newspapers. 
When Shtif returned to Russia he engaged in political work in 
several cities. He also volunteered at the Khevra Mefitsei Haskalah,26 
which fueled his academic interest in the field of Yiddish language and 
literature, and moved him further towards Yiddishism. He worked at 
the Jewish Colonization Association27 and was an editor for the Vilna 
publisher, B. A. Kletzkin. Shtif attended the Law Lyceum in Yaroslavl 
and received a law degree in 1914. During World War I he worked at the 
Evreiskii Komitet Pomoschchi Zhertam Voiny.28 After the revolution of 1917 
he campaigned to revive the Yidishe folks-partey. 
Shtif’s first major scholarly work appeared in 1913 in the pioneering 
academic volume, Der pinkes: Yorbukh far der geshikhte fun der yidisher 
literatur un shprakh, far folklor, kritik, un bibliografye,29 published in St. 
Petersburg, in which he wrote30 a scathing review of Meyer Pines’s 
History of Jewish Literature, which had been written in French as a Ph.D. 
dissertation at the Sorbonne and then translated into Yiddish. Dozens 
of reviews, articles, and essays were to follow in the next twenty years 
on literary history and criticism: Yiddish grammar, spelling, phonetics, 
linguistics, Socialism, and the Yiddishist movement. 
After the Russian Revolution Shtif moved to Kiev and worked in 
journalism and politics. The Central Rada of the Ukraine People’s 
Republic proclaimed Yiddish as one of its official languages, to be 
used in official documents and on national currency. It established a 
Ministry of Jewish Affairs, in addition to those for Polish and Russian 
affairs. It officially recognized a kind of ‘Jewish autonomy’. Jews 
served in a variety of government positions. In 1919 Shtif developed 
22  Russian: Jewish Life.
23  Yiddish: The New Life.
24  Yiddish: The People’s Voice.
25  Yiddish: The Friend.
26  Hebrew: The Society for the Promotion of the Jewish Enlightenment.
27  Founded in 1891 by Baron Maurice de Hirsch to help Russian Jews leave Russia 
after the pogroms of the 1880s. It bought agricultural land in North and South 
America and set up communities of Russian Jews as farmers on those lands.
28  Russian: Jewish Committee in Aid of War Victims.
29  Yiddish: Annals: Yearbook for the History of Jewish Literature and Language, 
Folklore, Criticism, and Bibliography.
30  Under the pseudonym bal-dimyen [Master of the imagination].
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many of his ideas in Yidn un yidish, oder ver zaynen ‘yidishistn’ un vos 
viln zey?31 
Shtif immersed himself in the medieval Yiddish holdings of the 
Asiatic Museum in St. Petersburg and the archives in Kiev. Years later 
in Berlin he would study early Jewish manuscripts from Germany, Italy, 
and England. He contributed to the journal Yidishe filologye32 and later 
edited Di eltere yidishe literatur: literarishe khrestomatye, mit an araynfir un 
derklerungen tsu yeden shrayber.33 
Passionately committed to Jewish civil and cultural rights in Europe, 
and to the future of Yiddish — the vernacular34 for nearly 11,000,000 
Jews — Shtif disseminated an influential memoir, Vegn a yidishn 
akademishn institut,35 in which he advocated the founding of a university-
level institution whose courses and research publications would be in 
Yiddish, and whose focus would be the full range of Ashkenazic Jewish 
culture. Leading Jewish intellectuals discussed the possibilities, and the 
YIVO was founded in Berlin, but almost immediately moved to Vilna 
in 1925.
Shtif’s lifelong devotion to Jewish affairs had moved him to take time 
and effort away from his academic interests; he worked with pogrom 
victims in Kiev, helped lead the Editorial Board, moved to Berlin with 
the others on the Board, and wrote Pogromen in Ukrayne: di tsayt fun der 
frayviliger armey. 
Shtif does not aim to catalogue all the horrors of the Denikin pogroms. 
He attempts, rather, to discern their common pattern and to determine 
their military, historical, and ideological roots. He points out that the 
Volunteer Army was badly fed and equipped, and it relied on constant 
plunder for upkeep. He maintains that since most of Denikin’s officers 
were Tsarist officers whose anti-Semitism was endemic, they either 
encouraged violence against Jews or tolerated it. He notes that during the 
31  Yidn un yidish, oder ver zaynen ‘yidishistn’ un vos viln zey? (Kiev: Onheyb, 1919; 
Warsaw: Nayer ferlag, 1920).
32  Yiddish: Yiddish Philology.
33  Yiddish: Old Yiddish Literature: a literary chrestomathy with an introduction and 
explanation for each author (Kiev: Kultur-lige, 1929).
34  The Czernowitz Conference of 1908 had declared Yiddish to be ‘a national language 
of the Jewish people.’
35  Yiddish: On a Jewish Academic Institute. First circulated as a memorandum, later 
published in Di organizatsye fun der yiddisher visnshaft (Vilna: Tsentraler Bilding 
Komitet, 1925).
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war years immediately preceding the pogroms, the Tsarist regime had 
already falsely accused Russian Jews of espionage, of betraying Russia 
to the Germans, and of conspiring to bring the Bolsheviks to power. The 
old regime had severely curtailed their civil rights and had effectively 
wiped out dozens of Jewish communities by deporting hundreds of 
thousands of Jews far from their homes near the front lines on suspicion 
of treason. Furthermore, the regime had secretly supported the brutal, 
anti-Semitic Black Hundreds. 
Shtif is at his most ‘academic’ when he brings to bear the tools of textual 
analysis on the writings of two prominent ideologues of the Volunteer 
Army, Vasiliy Vitalyevich Shulgin and Konstantin Nikolayevich Sokolov. 
Shulgin had been a Tsarist member of the last Russian Duma and was a 
close advisor to General Denikin. He was editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic 
Kiev newspaper, Kievlyanin. Sokolov had been a jurist and law professor 
who had helped write the Constitution of the Volunteer Army. In 1919, 
when Sokolov was named by Denikin to head the Army’s propaganda 
department, Osvag, he immediately fired all its Jewish workers.
Indeed, hatred of the Jews pervaded the top ranks of the Army. 
Peter Kenez has described this obsession with the myth of ‘Judeo-
Bolshevism’ this way: ‘Reading secret reports which were obviously not 
meant as propaganda, it is clear that this anti-Semitism, full of paranoid 
delusions, bordered on the pathological.’36 In the 1920s and 1930s those 
same delusions of a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy permeated Nazi 
pathology and helped pave the way for the Holocaust. They continued 
to fuel pogroms even after the end of World War II.
Though Shtif enjoyed immense esteem as a scholar and a founder 
of the YIVO, he did not feel financially secure. In 1926 he and a few 
other Yiddishist academics returned to Ukraine, attracted by the Soviet 
Union’s official ideology of respect for all its nationalities, by the 
funding of Yiddish scholarship, newspapers, literature, and theater, and 
by the promise of a decent salary. The following year he was named 
head of the Department for Jewish Proletarian Culture at the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences in Kiev, and he founded and edited its official 
journal, Di yidishe shprakh.37 
36  Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919–1920 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977), p. 172.
37  Yiddish: The Yiddish Language.
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One of the aims of YIVO’s founders was the systematization of 
Yiddish orthography, and great efforts had been made towards that 
end. The Soviet government, through its Jewish institutes, promoted the 
phonetic spelling of Yiddish words of Hebrew/Aramaic origin, which 
made reading easier and furthered its ideological aim to disguise those 
origins, which were denounced as being ‘nationalistic,’ ‘bourgeois,’ 
‘religious,’ and ‘Zionist.’ Nokhem Shtif and his journal embraced Soviet 
Yiddish orthography. 
The stage was being set for Stalin’s Great Purge. Tens of thousands 
of Soviets were falsely accused of treason, espionage, ‘Trotskyism,’ 
‘rightist deviation,’ etc. Many were coerced into ‘confessing’ their crimes. 
Thousands were fired from their jobs, expelled from the Communist 
Party, imprisoned, deported to undertake slave labor, or murdered 
outright. The Jewish victims were primarily rabbis, Zionists, Bundists,38 
and other non-Communist intelligentsia. 
Shtif was suspect. He had belonged to a Zionist organization in his 
youth. He had maintained contact with the YIVO in capitalist Poland, 
many of whose leaders were anti-Soviet Bundists, and he had been an 
activist for the now-banned Yidishe folks-partey. He was soon demoted. 
His department was replaced by the new and much larger Institute for 
Jewish Proletarian Culture, with Yoysef Liberberg — a member of the 
Communist Party — named as its head, though Shtif continued to lead 
its Philological Section. In 1928 both he and Liberberg were publicly 
reprimanded by the Party for inviting the eminent historian Simon 
Dubnow to attend the opening of the Institute. 
In 1929 Shtif went even further than the campaign for Soviet Yiddish 
orthography by publishing in his journal Di sotsyale diferentsiatsye in 
yidish: di hebreyishe elementn in der shprakh,39 in which he derided the 
Hebrew/Aramaic component of Yiddish as a useless reactionary relic 
of the religious and upper classes. In 1931 Max Weinreich, one of the 
founders of the YIVO, and an equally eminent philologist, wrote a 
blistering rebuttal to Shtif in 1931, Vos volt yidish geven on hebreyish?40 in 
38  Members of the Algemeyner yidisher arbeter bund in lite, poyln, un rusland [The 
General Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia], founded in 
1897.
39  Yiddish: Social Differentiation in Yiddish: The Hebrew Elements of the Language.
40  Yiddish: What Would Yiddish Be Without Hebrew?
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the journal Di tsukunft41 of New York. Shtif defended his position with 
Revolutsye un reaktsye in der shprakh42 in his journal (now re-named Afn 
shprakhfront43) in 1931 and 1932. 
But Shtif died in his office in Kiev the following year at the age of 54, 
and Weinreich wrote a generous obituary in Di tsukunft, praising Shtif’s 
scholarly contributions and passionate idealism. As for their recent 
public clash of ideas, Weinreich made only passing reference to Shtif’s 
articles, asking rhetorically whether they had really been the result of 
Shtif’s own thinking or of some sudden political pressure.
41  Yiddish: The Future.
42  Yiddish: Revolution and Reaction in Language.
43  Yiddish: On the Language Front.
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The Pogroms in Ukraine:  
The Period of the Volunteer Army1
Nokhem Shtif
Preface
I wrote this book in Kiev in March 1920, right after the Denikin atrocities that 
left a searing wound in our hearts and souls, even among those individuals 
and organizations who had been sympathetic to the Volunteer Army and 
who had hoped that it would be the “Angel of Deliverance” from Russia. 
They were all deceived, except for that small group of inveterate pessimists 
and those far-seeing activists who were struggling against that government. 
For the Jews of Ukraine it was a horrendous pogrom of murder and 
1 The original Yiddish text, Pogromen in Ukrayne: di tsayt fun der frayviliger armey (Berlin: 
Wostok, 1923) has been digitized in the Steven Spielberg Digitized Yiddish Library on the 
website of the National Yiddish Book Center in Amherst, MA, which affirms: “National 
Yiddish Book Center respects the copyright and intellectual property rights in our books. 
To the best of our knowledge, this book is either in the public domain or it is an orphan 
work for which no copyright holder can be identified. If you hold an active copyright 
to this work — or if you know who does — please contact us by phone at 413–256–4900 
x153, or by email at digitallibrary@bikher.org.” The work is available online at https://
s3.amazonaws.com/ingeveb/downloads/Shtif_Pogromen.pdf
Nota bene: Nokhem Shtif gives the dates of events using the Gregorian calendar adopted 
by the regime in 1918, sometimes followed by the Julian date. 
All footnotes in this section are by the translator unless otherwise stated.
Translation © 2019 Maurice Wolfthal, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0176.03
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devastation. The horrors of Ukraine in the year 1919 were unparalleled 
in the annals of pogroms. The bloody rampage has now subsided, and 
it is time to take stock.
At that time, my work had a specific purpose: to inform the world, 
and Jews in particular, of the destruction of the Jewish communities in 
Ukraine. As a member of the Editorial Board whose aim it was to collect 
and analyze documents concerning pogroms in Ukraine, I already 
had in my hands a quantity of materials on the pogroms committed 
by the Volunteer Army in 84 Jewish communities. My work rests on 
those documents. (I will discuss these materials more fully later. I am 
just summarizing here.) It soon becomes evident that the pogroms were 
indeed remarkably similar everywhere, when one considers how many 
took place in dozens of cities and towns. That is why I have avoided 
describing them individually: it would have meant endlessly repeating 
the same features. It seemed to me more useful, more informative, to 
outline the general characteristics of the main aspects, the typical pogrom 
activities of the Volunteer Army, and to discern a certain pattern from 
the details (the military character of the pogroms; the tortures; the mass 
rape of women; the total extermination of communities). 
First I will describe the spectrum of pogroms, from the so-called 
“quiet pogroms” to the mass slaughters, and how they ebbed and 
flowed through the years. The pattern was so well established that when 
I returned to this subject in the Spring of this year with documentation 
on previously undocumented pogroms in 21 towns (and some more 
materials on pogroms already known), I did not have to change one 
thing, and I had nothing important to add. I simply had to enlarge the 
text under each rubric with additional details of the pogrom, and of 
course add the place where it occurred in the supplementary list at 
the end. This convinced me even more that I had correctly grasped the 
essence of the Denikin pogroms and that my method had been a good 
one, and my explanation became clearer and more concise. Enough said 
about the first, descriptive, part of the work.
The second part, “The Causes of the Pogroms,” takes up two themes. 
First of all, it became necessary in the process of our effort, to explain 
exactly what had happened and the origins of those events. Second, 
we had to confirm such events if they were to be believed. Because it 
would be difficult for outsiders who had not experienced the horror 
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themselves, and for those who were ignorant of the situation between 
Russia and Ukraine in general, to believe such atrocities if they were to 
read of the pogroms themselves, not linked to or entranced by the theory 
and practice of the Volunteer Army. Therefore we wanted to show that 
these pogroms were part of their military campaign, an integral part, 
tightly knitted — as bone to bone and flesh to flesh — to the whole 
military and political program of the Volunteer Army. Anyone who was 
familiar with its program would find it easy to believe the horrors of 
the pogroms, because these pogroms were not a secondary event. They 
were a link in a chain; that is what I have tried to demonstrate. The war 
aim of the Volunteer Army, of course, was to drive out the Bolshevik 
regime, and its social and political program aimed to restore every 
aspect of the old Russia before the days of the Revolution. 
This was clearly evident in the way that the Denikin regime dealt 
with the three essential issues facing life in Russia: agriculture, labor, 
and the national question. These were their answers: The land must be 
returned to the aristocracy. The labor movement must be crushed. And 
complete Russification: we mock the national aspirations of the “alien 
tribes.” In that program, Jews will continue to be second-class citizens, 
oppressed and subservient. This has been the logic of Reaction in every 
age and every land. Especially at those critical junctures when its power 
is in shaky and it is struggling to maintain its power, Reaction adds 
to this logic that Jews, all Jews without exception, are “enemies of the 
people” who must be dealt with harshly and severely with all possible 
means. And as soon as this is proclaimed, there begin, of course, attacks 
on the helpless, and “the wrath of the people” breaks out again. In 
Germany the German nationalists are screaming right now for what the 
Volunteer Army did three years ago in Ukraine.
For the reactionaries pogroms are a way to prevent Jews from obtaining 
equal rights, which the hated Revolution granted them. Pogroms are the 
first step towards reducing them to a state of slavery. That principle, which 
I propose in the second part of my book, is at the root of the pogroms. In 
the eyes of reactionaries Jews are creatures without rights. And as soon as 
anyone dares to give them their rights, they are outraged and they burn 
to “put the crown back on the head of perverted justice.”
In the eyes of reactionaries, of course, Jews have no rights. They 
should not be politically active, and they must not have any Bolsheviks 
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among them, so that no one might accuse them of any “outrages,” 
because all the Jews are friends, and they are all responsible for each 
other. That has been the assumption of reactionaries for a long time. 
And that is the pogrom ideology of the Volunteer Army. It is an old 
story indeed. Nothing new or novel here, except for the Russian style 
and the Russian passion for finding things to bring back from the Dark 
Ages or from the atrocities of 1648 and 1760 in Ukraine.
The Volunteer Army contained elements of semi-civilized eastern 
peoples, Ossetians, Chechens, etc. and officers who were fortune-
hunters. It had a poor war plan: a front with no objective and a 
demoralized rear. It had to be a marauding army that lived off plunder. 
Historical tradition pointed the pillagers against the Jews. The generals 
and politicians sat back and watched, and they were quietly pleased: it 
was all for the best that the Army obtain its own supplies, feed itself, 
and stock up on reserves. And they counted on this criminal mind-set to 
achieve another aim: to drive out the Bolsheviks and take Russia back. 
Those were the material conditions that gave rise to the pogroms. But 
the generals were wrong. The wave of pogroms in the end engulfed 
them, too, those who had quietly sat by and even encouraged them. 
The brutal massacres threw the Army into disarray and almost ruined 
it. The old historical rule came into play: Reaction is always blind and 
carries with it its own Angel of Death.
Of course, when I took up this work again, I was able to discuss these 
larger questions directly without getting mired in more voluminous 
detail. I believe that we did not need more. It seems to me that the 
reactionary character of the White Guard and its objectives are totally 
and completely clear to everyone who has watched the fate of Russia 
during the last four years. The shameful defeat of the Guard on every 
front demonstrates it one last time.
That part of my work, the most significant, was ready in the Spring 
of 1920. I am very grateful to no other than… V. V. Shulgin, the editor of 
Kievlyanin, the ideologist and defender of the Volunteer Army. He was 
extremely useful in helping me grasp the philosophy of the Volunteer 
Army, especially its program for the Jews and its zeal for pogroms. That 
outstanding publicist wrote so much on the subject in Kievlyanin that 
when you read Shulgin it is like reading the Army itself on the subject 
of the Jews, its theory and practice. Shulgin is certainly the greatest 
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authority when it comes to anything relating to the Volunteer Army. He 
is its wise and trusted supporter. That was why I knew I could depend 
on his writings and rely on him, and on him alone. That was sufficient 
for my work. 
This Spring I obtained a second reliable testimony. I am referring to 
K. N. Sokolov’s unusual book, The Regime of General Denikin (Sofia, 1921).2 
K. N. Sokolov is a professor, an expert in government law, a minister in 
Denikin’s regime, which is to say one who was politically active on behalf 
of the Volunteer Army and who remained true to the White dictatorship 
and its methods to the very end. Even after its ugly demise, he describes 
the dictatorship with an openness and a frankness (except on the agrarian 
debate over “commercial” topics) of which he can be proud. We have 
here, then, an authentic explanation, a piece of incontrovertible evidence 
concerning the program and the politics of Denikin’s regime.
He did not add much to what we can learn from reading Shulgin. 
But for my work it was important that an authentic participant like K. N. 
Sokolov confirmed almost everything that I had said earlier about the 
essential nature of the Volunteer Army, its political theory and practice, 
and also about the roots and growth of its pogrom activities. I have taken 
some passages from Sokolov’s book on the principles and practice of the 
Volunteer Army on the most important issues in Russian life, and some 
that confirm Shulgin’s writings and my hypotheses. I was pleased that 
my earlier writing was thus corroborated. I considered V. V. Shulgin 
and K. N. Sokolov to be such iron-clad witnesses on the fundamental 
political aims of the Volunteer Army and on the Jewish question, that 
I did not require any more evidence to bring this work to completion. 
But in its present form, having analyzed the whole Volunteer system, I 
have gone beyond my original intention, and I believe it is ready to be 
presented to a broader audience of readers.
Here are just a few words on the nature of the documentation that 
I have used in the first, descriptive, part. It is original material, both 
because it has never been published before, and because it was collected 
for a specific purpose according to a certain format. The aim was 
historical, not political. The Editorial Board mentioned above was not 
aimed at the short term, but at the perspective of history. Its mission 
2  K. N. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina: iz vospominanij (Sofia: Rossijsko-
Bolgarskoe Knigoizdat, 1921).
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was to collect everything in connection with the pogroms in Ukraine 
starting in 1917: everything that victims, witnesses, and researchers 
saw or heard, reported as accurately as possible, official documents of 
government, institutions, organizations, etc. — all material for a large 
historical work. The greatest merit of this documentation is that it 
has absolutely nothing to do with newspaper sensationalism or party 
politics. 
The material is varied both as to the questions asked and as to its 
source. On the subject of a pogrom (or more accurately, pogroms) that 
occurred in the same place, there are often parallel documents assembled 
by different organizations, along different themes and using different 
methods. That in itself constitutes a verification of the facts under 
discussion. Furthermore there was verification within the Editorial 
Board itself, whose members would often meet with victims and with 
witnesses who had been compelled to flee in such large numbers to 
Kiev from many devastated towns, as well as with the correspondents 
and researchers for the editors. In addition, over the course of working 
for two years in Ukraine, the Board had accrued enough experience to 
have developed a feel for the accounts of the witnesses and informants. 
But it must be said that with respect to materials specifically in 
connection with the Volunteer Army, something stands out that makes 
them credible even if there were no strict verification: the very fact that 
huge numbers of reports are extremely similar. When hundreds of 
people from different places describe the pogroms in almost the exact 
same way, using the same words (and this cannot be said of accounts of 
pogroms by Petliura’s men or by bandits), that means that they are to be 
essentially believed. Either that or this is a case of mass hysteria, or they 
have all been prompted.
There is, finally, a quantity of documents: orders, announcements, 
decrees, etc., from local and central authorities; protocols; reports 
and memoranda of various organizations that were sympathetic to 
the Volunteer Army; lists of those who were murdered; reports from 
doctors who treated the wounded, etc. We thus have accumulated 
a unique collection of materials that will meet the strictest scholarly 
standards. If all this documentation were to be published, the world 
would be shocked. But I think that the little bit of material that I present 
here in a compressed summary, will be sufficiently convincing. 
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There is one great formal drawback to this material: we have only 
one side. We have heard and seen the oppressed but not the oppressors. 
That a Jewish commission would seek out the views of the oppressors 
on their thoughts and actions is almost unimaginable. But I am sure that 
even if that were possible, we would obtain more that was noteworthy 
from the psychological point of view, not the historical. The oppressed 
have reported enough on the events that is historical, objective, and 
credible.
We have such rare testimony from V. V. Shulgin and K. N. 
Sokolov — spokesmen and leaders of the oppressors — on the meaning 
and purpose of the pogroms, and on the link between those events and 
the essence and philosophy of the Volunteer Army, that we need look 
no further.
Berlin. July 17, 1922
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I. The Situation of the Jews in Ukraine  
Before the Arrival of Denikin’s Volunteer Army 
Anarchy and Pogroms
Since the Ukrainian nationalist movement began to campaign openly 
for an independent state (samostinost) at the end of 1917, but mainly 
since December 1918, when the Directorate3 — Vynnychenko,4 Petliura,5 
Shvets,6 Andriievskyi,7 and Makarenko8 — organized the revolt 
against Hetman Skoropadskyi,9 the land has not ceased to be a field 
for military operations. The bloody battle for power has not abated. 
The land seethes and sinks into anarchy and decay. Before that time, 
before the Denikin era, the land had gone through three regimes: the 
independent Ukrainian People’s Republic with the Central Rada and 
with the General-Secretariat, at the end of 1917; the brief Bolshevik 
regime, Pyatakov’s government,10 January–February 1918; fictional 
independence with the restored Central Rada, actually under German 
occupation, March–April 1918; the Hetmanate, a similar fiction under 
German rule, May–December 1918; the Ukrainian Directorate, end 
3  Provisional committee organized by the Ukrainian National Union to overthrow 
Pavlo Skoropadskyi’s Hetmanate.
4  Volodymyr Vynnychenko: member of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party and first 
Prime Minister under the General Secretariat, then member of the Directorate.
5  Symon Petliura: Supreme Commander of the army of the Ukrainian National 
Republic that was established in 1917 and chairman of the Directorate formed in 
1918.
6  Fedir Shvets: Geology professor, elected to the Central Committee of the Peasants’ 
Union and the Socialist Revolutionary Party, then the Directorate.
7  Opanas Andriievskyi: representative of the militaristic Ukrainian Party of Socialist-
Independentists in the Directorate.
8  Andrii Makarenko: representative of the Railway Workers’ Union in the Directorate.
9  Pavlo Skoropadskyi: General in the Russian Army, then the Ukrainian National 
Army, who in 1918 overthrew the provisional government and declared himself 
hetman. Was himself overthrown by the Directorate under Petliura.
10  Yuriy Pyatakov: a founder and leader of the Ukrainian Communist (Bolshevik) 
Party.
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of December 1918–February 1919; the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 
Bolsheviks in power, February–August 1919. 
General Denikin and staff (1916). Photographer unknown. Library of Congress, 
digital ID ggbain.29429. Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: 
Gen._Denikin_%26_staff_LCCN2014709587.tif 
But as different as these regimes were, they still shared some 
characteristics: 1) The land was fragmented under all the regimes, like 
a political chessboard of various powers. 2) The regimes were military, 
under constant mobilization. 3) The regimes were very weak.11
None of the regimes that considered themselves central or national 
ever actually controlled all of Ukraine. In various border areas, and 
even in the middle of the territory of a regime, that regime often 
competed with other “authorities” that “captured” and controlled their 
own provinces, districts, and counties, and considered themselves a 
government. This situation was especially notable before the second 
Soviet regime (February–August 1919). Parallel to the Ukrainian Soviet 
Republic (the Kiev regime) there existed at various times and in various 
combinations, Petliura’s Republic in parts of the provinces Volhynia 
and Podolia, Makhno’s and Grigoriev’s governments; not to mention 
territories that smaller partisan military units and criminal gangs had 
seized, led by the Atamans Zelenyi,12 Sokolovsky, Angel,13 Tiutiunik,14 
11  There was one exception. In this aspect the German occupation was stronger and 
better organized, but not totally [note by the author].
12  Danylo Terpilo.
13  Yevgeni Petrovych.
14  Yurii Tiutiunik.
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Struk,15 and others, who waged war under various flags or under no flag 
at all, primarily to plunder and “go wild” without interference. 
This political chessboard of an assortment of “authorities” battling 
for control over territory meant that each regime had to be above all a 
military organization capable of attracting Ukrainians and to maintain 
its power by waging war against its enemies on all fronts. Under such 
conditions it was impossible for a central government to really practice 
statecraft, to organize the economy and civil life. And the longer these 
military operations continued, the worse was the devastation of the 
land, exponentially.
Add to this situation the real weakness of the regimes. Not one 
of them, because of their short duration and other organic reasons, 
managed to take root and dominate the land. Not one managed to 
accomplish anything substantial for the people, while at the same time 
they demanded their manpower and their last bit of money. Not one 
of them was rooted in the way of life and political traditions of the 
population. That was why they all had to rely almost purely on military 
power and punitive expeditions. That was why each regime did not 
really govern except in the larger centers where it had its military power 
and garrisons, and only when that military was not in retreat. This was 
true even within its own territory, or better said, on territory that no 
other authority was claiming for itself.
Smaller towns and villages were left vulnerable. Every village that 
had been armed from head to toe in the World War was on a war-footing 
against every authority, resisted every government discipline, and 
readily helped every new power overthrow the last. The same villages 
provided the Directorate with an army to overthrow the Hetman and 
the Germans; helped the Bolsheviks against the Directorate; supplied 
Petliura with units and partisans against the Soviet authorities; and were 
a constant source of adventurists and criminal gangs. Through all these 
regimes, Ukraine gave the impression of a patchwork of republics and 
dictatorships, or better said, of innumerable military fronts. Three main 
movements were involved on these fronts in various entanglements: 
Ukrainian nationalism (samostiniks), Soviet Communism, and Anarchist 
banditry. Across the length and breadth of the whole country, from 
north to south, from west to east and back, regular military troops 
15  Ilya Timofeyevich Struk [note by the author].
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were constantly on the march and armed gangs were on the move, 
overrunning helpless towns and villages like a torrential flood with 
artillery fire and the most savage atrocities, shredding the last vestiges 
of a peaceable culture and a normal way of life.
It was a landscape of decay and ruination, with depressed and 
hungry towns that flocked like sheep to any pastor with a gun and 
lawless villages that no regime could subdue. It was not difficult to 
foresee that under such bloody circumstances, the Jews, unarmed 
observers standing by, would be passive victims, in particular within 
the Ukrainian tradition of pogroms. But the events that took place 
were far worse than anything that had been imagined. The war of the 
Directorate against the Hetmanate, and then against the Bolsheviks, 
which followed soon after, brought with it military pogroms in Ovruch, 
Korosten, Zhitomir, Proskurov, and Felshtin that made the pogroms in 
Ukraine of the previous fifty years pale by comparison, judging by the 
number of people murdered, and by their cruelty and savagery. 
Ovruch Pogrom (February 1919). Photographer unkonown. Wikimedia, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:OvruchPogrom.png
The situation grew even worse during the period of the Soviet regime. 
Petliura’s military campaign, and in addition the brutal guerilla war 
waged against the Soviets by various gangs, plus the involvement of 
local hooligans and bandits — all contributed to a state of permanent 
pogrom in Ukraine. 
Petliura’s detachments, Makhno’s, Grigoriev’s, and other units 
exterminated hundreds of Jewish communities and settlements. Many 
little towns were completely wiped out, or the few remaining Jewish 
survivors fled. Tens of thousands of Jews were murdered in the most 
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barbaric way. Even more were wounded, and many were permanently 
crippled. A large proportion of Jews in Ukraine have been reduced to 
begging, depending on the help of the Committee.16 Even worse than the 
economic ruin was the feeling of bleak despair. Helpless communities, 
like peaceful islands amid a sea of armed military people, lived in 
constant fear of death or losing their last few possessions. A little Jewish 
town that had been plundered and battered ten times was constantly 
aware that the murderer’s axe might strike any day, any time. 
The Economic Pogrom
The pogroms, of course, destroyed the economic well-being of many 
Jews in Ukraine, but there were other factors, too, that had undermined 
it. Industry came to an end during this civil war, following four years 
of World War. The country went from well-developed commerce to a 
primitive economy, bartering a shirt for forty pounds of potatoes, and 
business turned into speculation. Some became rich at the expense of 
hundreds of thousands of ruined people. The country, which had been 
closely connected commercially to Russia and to the world, suddenly 
became isolated. It broke down into fragmented, parceled, territories 
all at war with each other. And they all degenerated side by side, with 
no trains, no industry, no commerce. On the roads Jews were again 
vulnerable to the mortal dangers of medieval highways. The towns 
became parasites. They lost their economic function, and the villages 
settled scores with the cities. Such conditions were disastrous for Jews, 
many of whom were businessmen, tradesmen, craftsmen, and managers, 
who needed a developed system of trade as much as air to breathe; a 
vibrant exchange with distant markets; flexible credit; etc. — the whole 
mechanism of a free and undisturbed capitalist system. 
In addition, the Soviet agenda — the prohibition of commerce, 
the nationalization of the vast majority of industrial enterprises, 
the requisitions, the taxes — the whole economic war against the 
bourgeoisie, also helped ruin Jewish residents who lived mostly from 
trade and industry. In a little Jewish town the “bourgeois” was the 
owner of a little seltzer-water factory who owned his own little house, 
or the little shopkeeper, etc. The huge masses of Jews who lost their 
16  The All-Ukrainian Relief Committee for the Victims of Pogroms.
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regular jobs and could not manage to adapt to Soviet rule had to live off 
the wind, resorting to smalltime speculation that was very dangerous, 
or to selling off their household goods, or to living off the kindness of 
their children who could find jobs under the Soviets. 
Hopes for the Volunteer Army
It was therefore inevitable that when the Volunteer Army took over 
Ukraine in August 1919, the vast majority of Jews, more than other 
segments of the population, would welcome with joy and devotion any 
new regime that might restore safety and a peaceful existence. Who else 
had felt so deceived by all the previous regimes? Who else had suffered 
so many murders, massacres, and mortal fear? Who else was as much 
economically and emotionally depressed? And who else had longed, as 
much as the vast majority of Jews, for “law and order?” In retrospect 
it is difficult now to grasp, but in fact at the time when the Volunteer 
Army was starting to take over Ukraine, a large number of Jews looked 
upon it as though it were the Angel of Deliverance. And it is certainly 
true that among the Jewish delegations that went to receive the Army 
with bread and salt, this was not hypocrisy or just a despondent people 
asking meekly for mercy from the new authorities, but also a sincere 
enthusiasm for an authority that would bring “law and order.” They 
believed and they hoped, and they were ready to help and serve the 
Volunteer Army as best they could.
The political friends of the Volunteer Army among the bourgeoisie at 
home and abroad ceaselessly proclaimed that it would be a regime that 
established “law and order,” and that it would support a Constituent 
Assembly, a democracy, proper and rightful, with the working class 
and with Jews. At a time when cities and towns in Ukraine were isolated 
and disconnected from each other, and each Jewish community was 
practically a government unto itself, and there was very little news 
was available, and nothing from the other side of the front, under such 
circumstances the Jews had almost no information about the “excesses” 
and massacres that the Volunteer Army had already committed in June 
and July of 1919.
Even the Bolshevik press, which warned that this would be a 
Monarchist — Black Hundreds regime, made no special mention of 
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pogroms committed against Jews. Almost every city and every town 
had to learn the bitter truth only by living through it. They learned it 
too late, but until then a large proportion of Jews had hoped and wished 
that an army that could “liberate Russia,” and that stood for a united 
nation and a Constituent Assembly — according to Admiral Kolchak’s 
declaration — and that had shown such energy during the war — such 
an army would be strong enough to establish a government and put an 
end to civil war, and was possessed of enough statecraft to protect the 
peaceful communities, or at the least, not perpetrate pogroms itself. 
What else could a community like Bohuslav (Kiev province), have 
expected, where the pogrom went as follows: “On April 4, 1919, the 
partisans drove out the Bolsheviks and came into town. They pillaged 
and robbed all the Jews. They murdered twenty and wounded about 
fifty. Then our town became an encampment and suffered heavy 
artillery almost every day. On May 12 the Bolsheviks retreated. The 
partisans attacked again and murdered several more Jews, again robbed 
everyone, pillaging clothes and housewares. Finally on May 13 they set 
fire to Jewish houses and shops. They burned down fifty homes, 100 
shops and stores, and seven houses of worship.” The very same account 
could have been reported by dozens and dozens of Jewish communities. 
Just change the name of the perpetrators to: Petliura’s Cossacks,17 
Grigoriev’s army, Struk’s bandits, etc. The Jews soon realized that black 
days were facing them, and that the hoped-for Volunteer Army was 
surpassing the worst pogroms in the history of Ukraine.
17  Don Cossacks and Kuban Cossacks.
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II. Before the Pogroms and During the Pogroms
The Pogrom Road
We can now say with certainty that the strategic path of the Volunteer 
Army was the pogrom road, from its victory march of June–October 1919 
to the terrified retreat before the Bolsheviks in November 1919–January/
February 1920. “Such-and-such unit of the Volunteer Army arrived and 
committed a pogrom and left with a pogrom,” is the same formula that 
summarizes the reports of news from the vast majority of communities: 
Bobrovytsia (Chernihiv province); Bohuslav, Horodyshche, Korsun, 
Cherkasy, Smila (Kiev province); Tomashpil (Podolia province), 
etc. Wherever the Volunteer Army set foot, the Jewish communities 
suffered savage murders, massacres, and rapes. The Volunteer road 
mainly followed the train lines, its general strategy being to continue 
the civil war, with no specific frontline, but rather along the railroads 
and waterways. 
So as soon as the Volunteer Army took a train station, especially 
a junction, it meant that the other side — the Bolsheviks or Petliura’s 
army — immediately ceded an area to the east or to the north, which 
was taken without a battle. In this way large parcels of territory were 
conquered automatically merely by taking particular train junctions. 
Huge tracts of land, therefore, were won without the use of weapons. 
That territory was conquered quietly, without battle, by the police 
and the militias. Because of that, and because the commanders of the 
Volunteer Army were very impatient to use all their strength to seize 
the center, Moscow, as soon as possible, they left the rear of the army 
unprotected. As a result not every Jewish community in Ukraine 
suffered Denikin’s pogroms. There simply were no Volunteer Army 
units there, no pogromists.
The Volunteer Army crisscrossed through Ukraine on the railroad 
lines running from east to west: down the middle from Rostov to 
Kiev, through Kharkiv, Poltava, Ramodan; along the north through 
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Sumy, Konotop, and Niezhyn (Chernihiv province); along the south 
through Znamenka and Fastiv. And on the side lines that connect the 
administrative centers (especially the line between Bakhmach and 
Cherkasy), on the line running north from Kiev to the Chernihiv district, 
on the line running south to the Kiev-Volyn area, where they forced 
Petliura’s army to the Kiev-Kozyatyn line. A glance at these routes gives 
us a picture of the geography of the pogroms. 
The worst devastation occurred precisely at these rail centers: 
Konotop, Niezhyn, Bobrovytsia, Kremenchug, Cherkasy, Khorol, 
Pryluk, Bila-Tserkava, Fastiv, etc. or very near these train stations: 
Kaniv, Stepanets, Bohuslav, Mezhyrich, Rossovo, Tagancha, Hostomel, 
Makarov (Kiev province); Borzna, Novy-Malyn, Ostior (Chernihiv 
province). The converse is also true: historians of Denikin’s expedition 
will be able to easily trace the Volunteer Army’s movements, victories, 
and defeats by following the bloody tracks of its pogroms. 
The Ebb and Flow of the Wave of Pogroms
Types of Pogroms
The wave of pogroms increased as the Volunteer Army advanced 
deeper into Jewish territory, those areas where the Jewish population 
was in the majority in the cities and towns, especially in Kiev province. 
The Army felt the need to celebrate victories, to confirm their hope and 
certainty of winning the war. They were constantly being incited into a 
savage hatred of the Jews. The attitude towards pogroms was very clear 
that Jews were worthless, and there was no need to fear punishment. 
Under such circumstances, pogroms increased, and took on new targets 
and new tactics. Three stages can be discerned:
1. The period of “quiet pogroms,” as we might call them, 
mostly in Kharkiv, Poltava, and Yekaterinoslav provinces. It 
meant assaults against individual people. Every day people 
were attacked and beaten, and a few Jewish homes were 
plundered. But since it dragged on for months (for example in 
Kharkiv, Yekaterinoslav, Kiev), it victimized the whole Jewish 
community. The main purpose was quick robbery, especially 
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of money, jewelry, valuables. Murders were few, and they 
tried to excuse those by claiming that only Communists were 
being targeted or their sympathizers. The worst part of these 
“quiet pogroms” was the rape of Jewish women. The longer 
the pogrom lasted, the more women were raped. This was 
notably true in Yekaterinoslav.
2. The period of mass pogroms, in the eastern part of Poltava 
province, in the southern part of Chernihiv province, and 
the eastern part of Kiev province. During two or three days 
the entire Jewish population was systematically attacked 
and plundered. They went from house to house, pillaging 
everything, taking shirts right off people and their last shoes. 
They plundered the houses completely, from pianos to kitchen 
utensils, as well as the stores. They loaded everything onto 
wagons and took it all home to their lodgings on “the quiet 
Don.” They would hold an auction for some of the things, and 
sold them for change to Christians from town or from nearby. 
In addition, they would destroy any Jewish possessions that 
they could not steal or sell. They would burn some of their 
houses and shops, and murder them a few at a time. Sometimes 
they would extort huge bribes to let them live, especially with 
“Nikolayev” money. They raped Jewish women en masse.
3. The period of bloody pogroms, or slaughters in Kiev and 
Chernihiv provinces at the end of August and September 
1919, and in Podolia province while retreating until February 
1920. Such pogroms were perpetrated first in locales that 
changed hands many times in succession, like Borzna which 
changed hands five times. They were taking revenge for recent 
defeats, and the fabricated excuse was that Jews had shot at 
the Volunteer Army from their homes and hidden places. 
This occurred in Niezhyn, Borzna, Konotop, and Novy-Malyn 
(Chernihiv province) and Fastiv (Kiev province). It occurred 
mainly on their retreat in Krivoye-Ozero, Tomashpil (Podolia 
province), and some places in Kiev province. These were mass 
murders of the Jewish residents who could not hide or escape, 
in the most barbaric ways: 600 souls in Fastiv, and about the 
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same number in Krivoye-Ozero.18 They could not ransom their 
lives. Complete devastation, arson, and rape were the rule.
There was a little variation in the course of the pogroms, both as to 
their duration and as to the excuses that were fabricated. For example, 
no excuse was made for the slaughter in Rossovo (Kiev province), on 
August 28, 1919, as soon as the Volunteer Army took the town. But as 
a rule the pogroms of the Volunteer Army followed the same pattern. 
There were some changes after the mass murders of September 1919, 
probably due to new situations on the frontlines. The murderous energy 
of the Volunteer Army faltered as the Bolsheviks strengthened their 
position in the western part of Kiev province along the Irpen River to 
Berdychiv and further, and in the northern part of Chernihiv province. 
They began to drive out the Volunteer Army. The Poles controlled 
the western part of Volyn and Podolia provinces, part of Galicia (the 
Vinnytsia district). The south, in Kherson province and part of Podolia, 
where Baron Schilling’s army was operating, was disconnected from 
north Ukraine, because in the middle — in Yekaterinoslav province and 
also in Tovarish — Ataman Makhno was attacking. The powers that had 
ruled Ukraine were now being expelled to the north and the east. Most 
of the fighting was taking place in the Russian provinces, where there 
were small Jewish agricultural settlements on the roads to Moscow,19 
with attacks by Mamontov20 and Shkuro.21 When they were finished 
with the more recent communities, they turned on the long-established 
ones that had already suffered pogroms. The wave of massacres ebbed 
into “quiet pogroms.”
A new wave erupted with the shattering of the Volunteer Army 
in a terrified rout before the Red Army. They committed pogroms a 
second time, a third, a fourth, in parts of Kiev province: December 1919: 
Horodyshche, Cherkasy, Smila, Stavyshche, Monastyryshche, Tetiiv, 
and others. Part of Bredov’s22 army tried to break through to Rumania, 
18  Elias Heifetz, in his The Slaughter of the Jews in Ukraine (New York: Thomas Seltzer, 
1921), p. 111, puts the number murdered in Fastiv at 1,500–1,800. 
19  These settlements were not ignored, and there were slaughters in Balashov on 14 
July, in Kozlov and Yelets, 31 August/7 September, in Oriol and others [note by the 
author].
20  Konstantin Mamontov.
21  Andrei Grigorevich Shkuro.
22  Nikolai Bredov: lieutenant-general in the Russian army and a commander of the 
Volunteer Army.
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but they were stopped, so they turned back and perpetrated pogroms 
in Podolia Province. January–February 1920: Tomashpil, Yampol, 
Miaskova, Dzhurin, Yaruga, Verbka, and others. And at the end of April 
1920, when Petliura launched a new attack in Ukraine with the Poles, we 
find the old pogromists, the few remnants of Denikin’s Don Cossacks 
and Kuban Cossacks23 again slaughtering in Kalyus (Podolia province), 
this time in the service of Petliura or the Poles! 
Hostages
Before going into a description of the pogrom activities of the Volunteer 
Army, and its disastrous effects on Jewish life, one aspect of the Army’s 
treatment of the Jews is worth noting because it is characteristic of its 
whole campaign of pogroms. I am referring to the seizing of Jewish 
hostages. They resurrected this tactic, which the old Tsarist regime had 
tried and abandoned during the World War. Its purpose, like that of 
other outrages, had been to demonstrate that “the Jews are the enemies 
of Russia,” and they must be reduced to their old status of servility and 
submission.
On June 18 and 19, they seized eleven people as hostages in Valk 
(Kharkiv province): Shlessberg, a watchmaker; Glikin a tailor; Katz, a 
student; Brandes, a woman; a doctor, and others. The fabricated pretext 
was that when the Bolsheviks had retreated from various locales, they 
had taken hostages from the upper class, although without regard 
to nationality, Jews and Christians alike. Five of the Jewish hostages 
worked alongside their Russian co-workers in gardens that members 
of the Kharkiv Vegetarian Society had planted. A spokesman for 
that group, Grigory Khvostaty, stood up for those hostages, and was 
told: “We have nothing against your gardeners, only against a certain 
nationality.” The second in command added: “All kikes are Bolsheviks. 
You can slash them and murder them.” They shot one of the hostages, 
Glikin, on June 20. Shlessberg went insane. The rest were let go on July 1. 
The Volunteer Army was then starting to launch its military operations. 
Everywhere they were proclaiming that it was democratic and would 
23  Historically, numerous Cossacks from the Don and Kuban region fought in cavalry 
regiments in the Russian army under the Tsar, as well as in the ‘White’ armies 
during the Civil War against the Bolsheviks.
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treat all the nationalities of Russia equally, and the commanders 
realized that hostage-taking wasn’t appropriate. But the simple Cossack 
and officer, who took no interest in politics, found a better way to keep 
“the enemies” terrorized: a pogrom. 
The Welcome
It has already been noted that after the rule of the Bolsheviks, some 
Jews of the business and industrial class were ready to welcome the 
Volunteer Army as “their own” regime, which would restore a climate 
of private ownership and commerce. But even the majority of Jews, 
going against their economic interests and political sympathies, were 
terrified and depressed by unending pogroms, and naively hoped that 
the Volunteer Army would be a pillar of “law and order” and would 
certainly establish a “strong hand” to save the Jews from pogroms. 
That is why it was common that the Volunteer Army was welcomed 
warmly, and delegations were sent to greet them with bread and salt. 
They offered them food and raised sums of money were for the Army. 
But even then, right at the start, their disappointment was bitter. We 
will mention just a few examples among many. On August 25, 1919, 
in Boryspil (Poltava province) a Jewish delegation came out three 
times to welcome their honored guests. They asked to meet with the 
commander, but received this reply: “Bread and salt will not help you, 
Jewish murderers!” On September 13, a reconnaissance unit approached 
Bobrovytsia. Jews and Christians went to meet them, and the Jews were 
thankful that the threat of a pogrom no longer hung over them from one 
of Romashko’s gangs who were active in the area. But now they heard, 
“What are the kikes so happy about? Our men are coming, and we’ll 
butcher them all.” And, as elsewhere, they were prepared to fulfill their 
promise. They began to plunder and rape and murder Jews. Nor was 
money of any use when the military attacked a Jewish home at dinner 
time on October 17 in Pavoloch (Kiev province). And it didn’t help any 
that they generously fed the Cossacks in Fastiv. 
The Jewish delegation in Korsun met a harrowing end. The 
Bolsheviks had fled on August 24. The town learned that a unit of the 
Terek Plastun Brigade was 8 or 10 versts away at Razodovka village. A 
delegation of four Christians and three Jews went to meet them and to 
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welcome them to their town. On August 25 a small group of Cossacks 
arrived. Christians and Jews led by the rabbi greeted them. A meeting 
was held. Speeches were made, and assurances were given that the 
peaceful residents had nothing to fear; there would be no massacres; 
the inhabitants should remain calm and friendly, etc. The next day, on 
August 26, local Bolsheviks retook the town for a few hours. Two of the 
Jewish delegation (Scheinblum and Slavutsky) were murdered, because 
they had been sympathetic to the Volunteer Army. The third man went 
into hiding. 
Later that day a unit of the Plastun Brigade arrived and drove out 
the Bolsheviks, and they immediately began a slaughter. The rabbi, who 
had welcomed the Volunteer Army just the day before, was murdered 
in the most savage way. He was literally ripped apart. In general the 
pogroms started with the delegation. On August 29th, in Kaharlik (Kiev 
province) they greeted the Jewish delegation graciously. But the officer 
had barely turned away when his men attacked them and robbed them 
of everything. In the little town of Kobyzhcha (Chernihiv province) they 
attacked the Jewish delegation, which had come to the train station, and 
stole everything from them, stripped them naked from head to toe, and 
beat them. The town of Makarov, which had 4,000 Jewish souls, had 
already suffered through a series of pogroms from June to the end of 
August at the hands of local gangs. Most of the Jews had fled, leaving 
about 200 old men and women. They sent a delegation of 17 white-
haired elderly people. Not one of them returned. They had been hacked 
to pieces.
Pogroms
As has been noted, in many cases they began with the delegations, as a 
signal to start. A military unit comes to town, usually Cossacks, and they 
spread out in groups of 5, 6, or 10 men, often with officers. They rob and 
beat Jews who happen to be on the street, they strip them naked, shoot 
them and slash them with swords, and force the unfortunates to show 
them where there are richer Jews, and Jews in general. In many cases 
local hooligans join in, they lead the way and are thrown a bone from 
the bloody meal. They demand money from the Jews in their homes, 
especially “Nikolayev,” and jewelry, gold, and silver. Terrified Jews, 
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who have already suffered through earlier pogroms, waste no time in 
spreading out on the table everything that is in their pockets and chest 
of drawers. 
And the Cossacks immediately pack everything into their bags 
and sacks. They take everything down to the last shirt. But they’re not 
satisfied with that, and demand what has been hidden away. They 
terrorize them into revealing what is hidden and where, by inflicting the 
most cruel savagery, like lynchings. But they won’t believe them, and 
rip apart ovens, walls, floors, and bedspreads. They destroy attics and 
cellars and dig up yards. If they’re still not satisfied with their plunder, 
or if they find something hidden, they torture them and threaten them 
with death and pretend to shoot them, and then extort huge sums to let 
them live. And they tell them to borrow the money from their Christian 
neighbors.
In the midst of all this horror — as women and children are wailing 
and weeping, as the wounded are moaning, as windows are being 
smashed, furniture is ripped apart, ovens are being trashed, and 
walls are torn down — they start raping the women right in front of 
their parents, husbands, and children, and then leave the area. They 
pay no mind to the parents. Pleading and crying are of no use. Every 
attempt at resistance by the woman or the others ends with murder. 
Often they drag the women away with them. When they’re finished, 
they take all the Jewish possessions and pack them onto wagons, their 
own or those of farmers, or in trucks, take them to the station and load 
up the train cars. Sometimes, as in Bila-Tserkava, they turn the plunder 
over to their women who have come with them from the Don and the 
Kuban to watch. They smash whatever they do not want or cannot take 
with them, like furniture, or give it to local hooligans and farmers who 
have come prepared with wagons and sacks. And again they attack the 
homes, breaking down doors, windows, ovens. They turn the houses 
into ruins, when they don’t just burn them down.
One group leaves and another comes, then a third, etc., each one 
taking what has been left behind. Each time they again demand money, 
jewelry, etc. They rage like wild beasts, beating and torturing, stabbing 
and shooting at those who have not managed to escape and hide the 
first time around. They hunt down the Jews, who run through the 
streets from house to house, almost naked and barefoot, half-crazed, 
 37II. Before the Pogroms and During the Pogroms
desperately looking for a place to hide, a hole, a field, a woods. The 
best they hope for is to hide with a Christian neighbor. But not for long, 
because the rumor spreads that Christians may not hide Jews, and even 
a good Christian pleads with the Jew to leave, or just throws him out. 
This “wildness” can last “legally” for three days, the Cossacks report, 
but sometimes goes longer, sometimes shorter, depending on how long 
it takes to finish the job. 
During all this there are some desperate and daring Jews who struggle 
to find their way to “the authorities” to make their accusations. First 
they get a lecture: “Kikes are commissars”… all Jews are Bolsheviks… 
Jews have ruined Russia… Jews are the enemies of the Volunteer Army. 
Then they are insulted and thrown out, depending on the personal 
whim of the local commander, the garrison chief, etc. They are advised 
to offer a generous bribe to the Cossacks, and nothing more will 
happen, because “Measures have already been taken.” But it is obvious 
from the words of “the authorities,” and it is made abundantly clear, 
that nothing can be done because the Cossacks are “extremely angry” 
with Jewish Bolsheviks, and “they are right.” Sometimes the order is 
given that “violent acts” against peaceful residents must stop. But these 
“measures” and “orders” have this in common: no one pays attention 
to them. The pogrom criminals know “the authorities” well, and they 
laugh at their paper displeasure and their paper threats. The pogroms 
run their course until their natural end: when there is nothing more to 
pillage, nothing left to destroy. Usually the order to stop comes after it 
is all done. There was a case in Bila-Tserkava, where Colonel Sakharov 
proclaimed an order banning pogroms on September 1, 1919, two weeks 
after the pogrom had begun. 
After a few days, the remaining survivors crawl out of their hideouts 
and start collecting the corpses of the murdered in the houses, the 
attics, and the cellars, and on the streets where the dogs and pigs have 
ripped them apart. They bury them in mass graves and pay their last 
respects. Sometimes when Jews gather for this tragic ceremony, it 
becomes another opportunity to take revenge on “the Bolsheviks,” to 
steal their last pair of boots, to rape the women, etc. At such a funeral 
in Bobrovytsia they raped the 15-year-old daughter of the caretaker at 
the cemetery. Finally “things quiet down,” as the commanders write in 
their reports. 
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The “quiet pogrom” now replaces the mass pillage and murders. 
Jews are robbed on the street and in their homes. As soon as the sun 
sets, the town becomes deathly quiet. There are no Jews on the street. 
Dozens of families gather in the few houses that are still intact, so as 
to get through the terror together, through the awful nights. They lock 
themselves in, they bolt the doors and gates and listen for every sound. 
In this deadly silence they can hear rifle shots here and there, followed 
by terrible screams. They come from a house that has been attacked and 
from the neighbors: banging, drumming, whistling — a primitive way 
to let “the authorities” know and to scare away the murderers. 
We have an account of that terror and those harrowing screams in 
the black of night, related with the highest level of credibility.24 It was 
described by none other than V. V. Shulgin, editor of Kievlyanin, a highly-
placed source, the true ideologue of the pogrom campaign. He certainly 
has no interest in exaggerating the massacres by his Volunteer Army. 
He writes: “At night a medieval terror reigns in the streets of Kiev. In the 
empty streets and the deathly quiet heart-rending screams can be heard. 
It is the “kikes” who are screaming. They are screaming in terror. On 
a dark street somewhere a mob of people with knives rushes through 
apartment buildings from top to bottom. Whole streets, overcome with 
terror, are screaming with horrendous voices fearing for their lives. It 
is terrifying to hear these voices… harrowing, a veritable Inquisition 
that the whole Jewish community is experiencing.”25 At that time V. 
V. Shulgin was living in a Jewish neighborhood in Kiev, incidentally 
not far from the commander-in-chief of the Kiev district, General 
[Vladimir Mikhailovich] Dragomirov. He certainly heard plenty of 
“those harrowing screams,” especially on the nights of October 17–22, 
1919, and we can trust him. He modestly veils the atrocities of those 
“people with knives,” and, incidentally, he draws a moral lesson from 
this horrendous tragedy, both for him and for the Jews. We will discuss 
this more later.
So it grows “quiet” until the next occasion. For example, a military 
unit leaves and another comes in its stead; or there’s a defeat on the 
front; or the Bolsheviks take a town for a while and then they are 
24  Richard Pipes estimates that 300 Jews were murdered in this “quiet pogrom.” See 
Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 108. 
25  ‘The Terror Inquisition,’ Kievlyanin, No. 37, dated 8/21 October 1919 [note by the 
author].
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driven out, and are forced to retreat. Pogroms erupt each time with 
increasing ferocity. These repeat pogroms are often the bloodiest, the 
most horrendous.
In such cases it develops in a state of permanent pogrom that can 
last for weeks or months as in Bobrovytsia, Borzna, Niezhyn (Chernihiv 
province); Bohuslav, Bila-Tserkava, Fastiv, Cherkasy (Kiev province); 
and others. It was most savage when they took over a town and when 
they left it, and in between there was a “quiet pogrom.” In the larger 
cities, like Kharkiv, Yekaterinoslav, and Kiev, it was mostly a “quiet 
pogrom” with mass slaughter only on occasion. Kiev suffered such 
mass pogroms on October 17–22, when the Volunteer Army was beaten 
by the Reds and then took back the city, under the eyes of General 
Dragomirov, their supreme commander, General Bredov, the military 
leader, and other “authorities.”
The permanent pogrom ebbs or stops for a while only in two 
situations: either when the Cossacks leave, or when the last remaining 
Jews escape. Whole Jewish communities that could no longer bear the 
Inquisition and living in mortal fear, and had nothing more to lose, took 
the elderly and the children and the sick and set out on foot wherever 
the dangerous road would take them, usually to the nearest Jewish 
community, which had been devastated and turned to ruins, just like 
their own.
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III. The Volunteer Army’s Own Style of Pogrom 
Before the period of the Volunteer Army, Ukraine had already 
experienced many pogroms of various types, by Petliura’s military 
units, Atamans, and ordinary bandits. Nevertheless the Volunteer Army 
managed to be innovative, adding something new of its own that made 
it stand out from the earlier pogroms. The most prominent features of 
its style were: 1) its military character 2) the mass rape of women 3) 
special humiliations and tortures 4) the extermination of entire Jewish 
communities. In that aspect its only rivals were the slaughters by the 
Cossacks in the 17th and 18th centuries during the eras of Khmelnytsky 
(1648) and Gonta (1768).
The Military Character of the Pogroms. Relations  
with the Local Population
Local Christians had taken part in the earlier pogroms of 1919, mostly 
the ignorant peasants and the reactionary wing of the intelligentsia, 
particularly those who felt they had been harmed by the Revolution; 
former officials from the Tsarist regime; and others of the privileged 
class. It was these reactionaries who prompted the pogroms, incited the 
poor peasants, and brought in the gangs. 
But under Denikin’s rule, pogroms were a military activity. Then it 
was the military that initiated them and carried them out. Most of the local 
Christians had nothing to do with them. They were apathetic or hostile to 
Cossack atrocities. In some cases peasants from surrounding villages took 
part, but they did nothing more than take the plunder that the Cossacks 
were throwing away, or taking household goods from houses that the 
owners had been forced to abandon. Local residents rarely took part in 
pogroms. This occurred in Rossovo, Bohuslav, Fastiv; Boryspil. 
Very seldom did local Christians actively participate or incite them, 
as in Boyarka and Rakitna (Kiev province). Rather we see local Christians 
treating Jews decently, hiding them in their homes, standing up for 
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them, sending official delegations to the military commanders in the 
cities and various organizations, courageously and heroically risking 
their lives on their behalf, in Bila-Tserkava, Horodyshche, Hostomel, 
Veprik, Cherkasy (Kiev province); Borzna, Konotop, Niezhyn, Novy-
Malyn; Boryspil; Dzhurin, Krivoye-Ozero (Podolia province); and in 
many other places. Many Jews owed their lives to that compassionate 
behavior, without which the devastation would have been much worse. 
But the situation grew worse with time: the state of permanent 
pogrom was demoralizing. Robbery, murders, slaughters were 
perpetrated day or night, not just by criminals but by the regular army 
and its officers. It was done right in front of everyone, and the superior 
commanders either pretended not to know or gave tacit assent by not 
prohibiting it and by not punishing anyone. Pogroms were a legal way 
of life. Jewish possessions were for the taking, and gradually some of the 
local Christians joined in the robbery. In many cases Christian farmers, 
especially those in nearby villages, would not let Jews hide in their 
homes, supposedly because they were not permitted to do so. In the 
town of Kozyn (Kiev province) farmers hid Jews at first, but seeing the 
actions of the military authorities, they themselves beat the Jews. The 
same occurred in Stepantsi, and especially in Tagancha (Kiev province). 
But the opposite also happened, and even where there was no 
moral repugnance at first, horrendous acts of violence elicited human 
compassion. For example in Niezhyn, where the Christian residents 
showed no sympathy towards the Jews, nevertheless, when they 
witnessed the horrors they hid Jews in their homes and sent a delegation 
led by priests to the military authorities to plead for the Jews. On those 
harrowing days some Christians showed great compassion by standing 
up for Jews at a time when just saying a good word about Jews was in 
itself a crime, and there were those who were beaten for doing that, in 
Borzna (Chernihiv province) and Horodyshche (Kiev province). 
A most unusual case should be noted in Horodyshche concerning 
one Haritsai. Although he was a bandit who had taken part in an earlier 
pogrom there, he was grateful to Jews who had saved him from death 
at the hands of the Soviets, and he showed up at the last minute when 
Cossacks were about to shoot a group of Jews. He defended them so 
vigorously, with such moral conviction and devotion, that it even 
moved the Cossacks, and in that way he saved them from certain death. 
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In short, taking everything into consideration, the pogroms were 
simply a military tactic for the commanders of the Volunteer Army. In 
some cases state troopers (police) joined in. For example in Rossovo the 
police chief himself, along with his militia, shot Jews who had returned 
to the ruins of their homes after a pogrom. The militia did the same 
in Kokhnyn (Kiev province), police chief Pampushka in Stepanets, 
the militia in Stavishche (Kiev province), and elsewhere. By the way, 
the same Pampushka had been the leader of a partisan unit for the 
Bolsheviks. In general the police terrorized the Jews and extorted money 
from them. But the bulk of the pogroms were carried out by the regular 
Army. And by doing that it alienated itself even from the Christian 
population, even among the villagers, who were generally conservative, 
particularly in within the Pale of Settlement and who had looked upon 
the Volunteer Army as the liberators and “saviors”of Russia.
The Mass Rape of Women
The mass rape of Jewish women was the most distinctive, striking 
feature of the Volunteer Army pogroms. It put its special stamp on 
them. There had been horrendous slaughters before. One need only 
mention the slaughters of Petliura’s Army in Proskurov and Felshtin in 
Feburary 1919; Grigoriev’s bloodbaths in Cherkasy and Yelizavetgrad in 
May 1919. Rapes had been rare, few in number. But with the Volunteer 
Army it became systematic, along with plunder and murder. They 
raped women everywhere, even in the “quiet pogroms” and in the 
larger cities. In Yekaterinoslav they raped thousands of Jewish women. 
In smaller towns, it was hundreds which meanswomen, almost all those 
who could not manage to escape or hide themselves for long. 
The manner in which it was done has already been noted. 1) It was 
done out in the open, in front of husbands, parents, and children. 2) 
No one was spared this horror for any reason or age, from little girls as 
young as 8 to elderly women. One might imagine that the reports from 
so many different local informers, as well as the special investigation 
on the rape of women, might be the nightmare of some delirium, but 
then one would have to draw the even more fantastic conclusion that 
hundreds of people who had never met each other had somehow 
colluded to make up the exact same story, using almost the very same 
words, even inventing the names of the victims. One would have to 
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believe that masses of Jewish women went to doctors and midwives for 
help and, with no shame whatsoever, made up the foulest and vilest 
stories about themselves. 
So horrendous are the accounts that they are difficult to grasp. Here 
are a few of the countless reports. In Korsun (Kiev province) two cases 
are documented of the rape of women in their seventies: In Rossovo a 
75-year-old woman in Rossovo in front of her husband and daughters; 
in Tomashpil; and elsewhere. In Kremenchug six Cossacks raped a 
woman who was suffering from typhus. In Korsun they raped a woman 
who was on her deathbed, and she died on the spot. In Niezhyn and in 
Rossovo they raped women in childbed. In Pryluk they stopped a girl in 
the street in broad daylight across from the district office, they stripped 
her naked and raped her. Eight to ten Cossacks would rape one child. In 
Cherkasy they bit a raped girl from head to toe, till she was all swollen. 
In Borzna they seized a group of girls in the street, whipped them, then 
raped them. 
They dragged Jewish women and girls out of their homes, and they 
never came back. Others were snatched straight out of trains. Many 
of the victims came down with the vilest venereal diseases. Others 
lost their sanity. They raped and then murdered many. Some women 
begged for death rather than be raped. And many Jews, old and young, 
ended up dead trying to protect their own from shame and tragedy. 
There are no words…
Humiliation and Torture
It would be hard to be original in cruelty after such pogrom criminals 
as those of Zelenyi’s gangs and Sokolovsky’s gangs, and Petliura’s 
Atamans, Palienko (during the first pogrom in Zhitomir January 1919), 
[Ivan] Semosenko (the slaughter in Proskurov), and others.26 
Yet in this respect the Volunteer Army managed to outdo them, 
both in the variety of violence and degradation and in the enthusiasm 
with which they committed them. First of all, there were methods 
26  Almost 2,000 people were murdered in one day in Proskurov. See Peter Kenez, 
‘Pogroms and White Ideology in the Russian Civil War’, in Pogroms: Anti-Jewish 
Violence in Modern Russian History, ed. by John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 293–313 (p. 295). 
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reminiscent of the Inquisition. These were the primary means to extort 
money from people, to ransom their freedom. Their methods were so 
varied, so thought-out and consistent, that it seemed as though they 
were not simple murderers doing their usual quick work, but rather 
serious, pious monks of the Inquisition attempting to extract the truth. 
Such techniques as threatening people with a rifle, putting them against 
a wall, beating them, brutalizing them, breaking their limbs — this was 
“banal,” workaday. 
The Volunteer Army employed “more refined” methods, for 
example hanging people to frighten them. This is how they did it. They 
would put a noose around the victim’s neck and throw the rope over 
the first hook in the house, and they hanged him, not long enough to 
kill him — because they needed him alive to pay the ransom, or to show 
them where something was hidden — or just to watch him hanging 
there, between life and death. Then they let him down till he regained 
consciousness. Then they stuck a rifle into him, or hit him with a whip, 
and demanded that he show them what was hidden, that he give them 
money, etc. And they would do this until people brought the ransom 
money. There were cases where they hanged someone three times, 
Berkovich in Krivoye-Ozero; someone else seventeen times (Smilianski 
in Cherkasy, from whom they extorted half a million rubles); and a case 
where they compelled a high-school boy, Boris Zabarski in Fastiv, to put 
the rope around his father’s neck.
They used medieval tortures using fire. They would burn someone’s 
face with a candle, and they threw people into fires. In Bila-Tserkava, for 
example, they did it to a man named Grossman, who had escaped the 
pogrom in Volodarka, and he died. They would burn the hair on your 
head, the soles of your feet, etc. And they combined the tortures. They 
would hang someone and burn the soles of their feet with candles, as 
they did in Kaharlik. It was just like the Inquisition torture rack. They 
ripped the hair from your beard. They stuck needles into your feet, etc. 
In Boryspil they demanded 25,000 rubles from a man named Lilegart. 
First they knocked him to the ground and kicked him, then they threw 
him into a box and stabbed him with knives. Then they pulled him out, 
half-dead, and shot him right in front of his mother and sister.
The Volunteer Army murdered thousands of Jews, those gray-haired 
old “Communists” that they rounded up as they were studying Gemara 
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in the prayer houses, those “Communist” infants in their cradles, along 
with their mothers and grandmothers. Among those murdered, the 
number of tortured elderly, women, and children is shocking. They shot 
people to death, but in greater numbers they stabbed them, slashed them 
with swords, chopped off their heads. Many died in homes that they 
set on fire, more than 100 in Fastiv alone, Lutshinets, Dzhurin, Yaruha 
(Podolia province). In Korsun they strangled 80-year-old Sukhodolski. 
They buried alive 90-year-old Frume Pekar in Rozhiv; two people in 
Tetiiv; Ben-Zion Evalenko in Obrukhov (but he got out alive), and more 
and more.
But such a death might have been preferable for those who were 
tortured endlessly, their tongues cut out (like Kisman in Fastiv, who 
had already been wounded by a bullet), their ears, their noses, their 
eyes gouged out (like Yampolski in Fastiv), their hands and feet cut off, 
etc. What can we say of the “idyllic scenes” staged by Russian officers? 
They strung Jews to sleighs instead of horses, as in Horodyshche. Or 
they ordered brutalized, half-naked people whose parents and children 
were murdered right in front of them to hold hands and merrily 
dance a karahod while singing, “Murder the Jews and save Russia!” 
in Mykhailivka (Kharkiv province); Kaharlik (Kiev province); Borzna 
(Chernihiv province); and elsewhere. 
The Extermination of Jewish Communities
We have seen that the Volunteer Army was not satisfied with merely 
plundering Jewish possessions. They were just as inclined to simply 
destroy everything, and this annihilation was, so to speak, the ideal 
of the Volunteer Army: selflessly devoted to rooting out the Jews 
completely. We have already seen that the emptying out of household 
goods and furniture, and the burning down of homes and stores, was 
part of the plan, especially in the provinces of Kiev and Podolia. No 
other group had done this on such a massive scale, so systematically, or 
so thoroughly as the Volunteer Army. Many Jewish towns and villages 
had already suffered pogroms in 1919, but they had managed to hang 
on. The Volunteer Army now dealt them the death blow. 
Other towns, like Fastiv, which had happily avoided the first wave of 
pogroms, and which had welcomed thousands of unfortunates who had 
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fled from that hell, first experienced that kind of systematic annihilation 
at the hands of the Volunteer Army. Many towns were decimated by 
the burning down of houses: Bohuslav, Bila-Tserkava, Horodyshche, 
Hostomel, Korsun, Makarov, Rakitna, Rossovo, Talne, Shpola (Kiev 
province); Boryspil; Niezhyn; Krivoye-Ozero, Tomashpil, Myaskova, 
Savran (Podolia province), and others. 
Towns like Fastiv, for example, with 10,000 Jewish residents, were 
left almost completely empty amidst the flames and smoke. In Fastiv 
alone, 200 Jewish houses were totally burned down, and as many shops. 
They systematically destroyed not only private property, but also 
community institutions. They demolished and burned Jewish prayer 
houses, hospitals, old-age homes, schools, free-loan associations, and 
cooperatives. In Bila-Tserkava they turned the Talmud-Torah27 into an 
outhouse, and one part of its courtyard into a horse-stall, although there 
was a deserted horse shed nearby. They smashed the window panes 
and the oven doors. In Rossovo they destroyed the free-loan association. 
The Cossacks tore apart the drawers, the cabinets, the tables, the 
accounts. They broke into the warehouse and plundered everything. 
They struggled for a long time to break into the safe. Finally at one in 
the morning they put pyroxylin under the safe and blew up the whole 
building.
They destroyed Jewish homes and stores on a massive scale after 
first plundering them. One result of this was that economic life was 
paralyzed, because the terror and the attacks on Jews did not stop even in 
the “quiet pogroms.” All this resulted in dozens of Jewish communities 
being annihilated. Life became unbearable in the towns and villages 
where there reigned a “permanent pogrom.” So despite the fact that 
death lurked on the roads, the survivors fled wherever they could, 
starving, naked, barefoot, with the elderly and children. They would 
often stumble onto communities that had already been devastated. 
There these homeless would have to depend on charity. 
As more and more villages were destroyed, and more people were 
made homeless, the availability of assistance dwindled. Many ended 
up horribly cramped in prayer houses and poorhouses, dying in huge 
numbers from hunger, cold, and even more from epidemics, especially 
typhus. The death rate among Jews at that time was so high that it was 
27  Hebrew and Yiddish: traditional Jewish elementary school.
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often impossible to bury them in the proper time, and corpses had 
to wait for graves. It can be said that if Jews were murdered by the 
thousands by Cossack bullets and swords, but they died by the tens of 
thousands in the suffering after the pogroms, from starvation, the cold, 
and typhus.
Indeed dozens of Jewish communities were rendered homeless: 
Boryspil, Boyarka, Hostomel, Dymer, Ignatovka, Yaruha, Kaharlik, 
Kobyzhcha, Kozyn, Krivoye-Ozero, Mironivka, Moshny, Orlovets, 
Pototsky, Rozhiv, Rosava, Tagancha, Tarashcha, Sharhorod, and others. 
Some of those who tried to return home were murdered, for example in 
Rosava, and at best they managed to escape again, as in Boyarka. The 
Cossacks burned down the ruined houses, or local peasants moved in. 
There was no going home.
But the ruined communities that could not manage to escape and 
had to remain were no better off. They, too, died by the thousands from 
the cold, starvation, typhus. The situation of such a well-established and 
solid community as Fastiv, after the first pogrom of September 22–26, 
1919, is described in a report on relief assistance: “We evacuated 75 
seriously wounded people to Kiev. A number of them were murdered 
in the hospital in Kiev during the pogrom there. We requisitioned 2 
epidemics barracks for 500 people and two shared-living quarters. 
We are feeding 6,500 people in soup-kitchens. Ten to twenty people 
die every day.” In such a small town as Vasilikov 400 Jews were sick 
with typhus in November 1919. In smaller towns, especially the more 
isolated ones, the situation was even worse.
The Volunteer Army did not devastate only Jewish communities 
in the towns, but also the tiny Jewish settlements in the villages. 
Their experienced eyes uncovered Jews everywhere. In the village of 
Gogolenko (Chernihiv province) there lived five Jewish families. They 
had been allowed to buy land for the first time after the Revolution, just 
like the farmers. The Cossacks destroyed everything, and they barely 
escaped with their lives to Borzna.
It was particularly painful to see Jewish farmers rooted out, along 
with so many other Jewish communities. Near Fastiv there were three 
Jewish agricultural colonies amidst a sea of farming villages. They 
were three Jewish islands of manual labor and the peaceful life of the 
plough: Koldubitskaya-Obraz-Tsovaya, Trilesy, and Tchervelenskaya. 
They had been granted the land even before Tsar Nikolai I. They had 
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managed to prevent the Tsarist officials from taking their land for 
years. Three, four generations had worked the land. But the Volunteer 
Army destroyed them. 
A special investigator described the devastation in the Koldubitskaya 
Colony. Petliura’s Army committed the first pillaging when the 
Directorate escaped from Kiev, in February 1919. His gangs would not 
leave the Colony in peace all summer long. In August Petliura’s units 
again came and left. They stole food and cattle, set fire to several homes, 
and murdered several people. Still, the Colony hung on. The Volunteer 
Army came at the beginning of September, and they continued to 
rob and beat people. When the Cossacks pulled out, they murdered a 
colonist who was digging potatoes in the garden. 
During the battles between the Volunteer Army and the Bolsheviks 
outside Fastiv at the end of September, all the colonists, 200 souls, 
escaped to the village of Veprik, the district seat. Only the elderly stayed 
behind. A unit of the Volunteer Army soon entered Veprik, saw the 
Jews at the skhod (village square) and accused them of having joined the 
Bolsheviks, and of being spies. They began shooting them down. The 
starshina28 and the starosta29 were there, and they swore that the Jews had 
been with them the whole time, with the farmers. 
Then they marched them under guard to Fastiv. On the road they 
robbed them, brutalized them, and seized all the girls. Two of them 
never returned. The Jews in Fastiv gave them a prayer-house, and 
these working people had to live off charity. Back in the Colony, the 
elderly had been murdered, some burned alive. The food, the cattle, 
and the horses had been stolen. The Colonists who were in Fastiv later 
recognized their horses pulling wagons for the officers. One officer 
offered to sell them back the horses as 10,000 rubles a piece. The other 
two colonies were annihilated in the same way.
Jewish farmers from the Rikun Colony (Dymer district, Kiev 
province) sent a letter to the supreme commander, General Dragomirov, 
protesting the fact that the Cossacks had stolen 10 cows, several horses, 
and all the poultry. Then they stole 60 head of cattle. They begged him 
to return their goods. The last lines of their complaint betray their deep 
anger as well as their naiveté: “If our horses and cows are not returned, 
28  Ukrainian: village headman.
29  Ukrainian: district headman.
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our Colony will come to an end, we will have to go back to the city or 
take up business.” 
The Officers
Let us note here another aspect of the Volunteer Army pogroms. On 
October 17–20, during the mass pogrom in Kiev, you could observe 
in Jewish homes the refined manners of uninvited guests who had 
been “well-educated,” who spoke French, and even many musicians. 
These were officers of the Volunteer Army who had been members 
of the [Russian Imperial] Leib-Guard Preobrazhenska and Semyonov 
divisions and other regiments. They showed no “coarseness.” In a firm, 
and in a manner-of-fact tone, they extorted money, jewelry, and gold. 
Sometimes one would politely request a handkerchief of fine cloth, 
saying he would return it clean. Not all the officers were so “refined,” 
those commanders of the Ossetians, the Chechens, and other Caucasus 
tribes. 
But when it came to committing pogroms, they were not inferior to 
their highborn comrades. On the contrary. As a general rule, the officers 
supported the troops under them, either openly or secretly. In Pryluk 
an officer of the Semyonov regiment saw a soldier in torn boots, and he 
said to him: “Why don’t you go up to the first Jew and take his boots?” 
In Bila-Tserkava officer Yakovlev of the Second Terek Plastun Brigade30 
asked his commander, Colonel Shchepetilnikov, for clothes to dress in, 
and the reply was: “Rob a Jew. Nothing will happen.” We have reports 
of officers plundering in Bogodukhov, Borzna, Boryspil, Horodyshche 
(Lieutenant Captain Svetsky and Ensign Kalgushkin); in Dymer 
(Lieutenant Colonel Beznebov), in Korsun, Kremenchug, Niezhyn, 
Pryluk, Fastiv, Cherkasy, Tomashpil, Yampol, Kurilovtsy, Tetiiv (Prince 
Golitsyn and Prince Lvov), and others.
In some places the officers initiated the pogroms: Boyarka, Rossovo, 
Krivoye-Ozero (Officer Mlashevsky), Mohilev-Podolsk (Colonel 
Mizernitsky), Miaskova, and others. Dr. S.,31 on behalf of Dr. B., reports 
30  Those infantry brigades were primarily formed by Kuban Cossacks. 
31  This is undoubtedly Dr. Snisarenko who served in the Second Terek Plastun 
Brigade. The report dates from the time when the Volunteer Army was still strong 
in Ukraine [note by the author]. 
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on pogroms led by officers in Bila-Tserkava: Ensign Kuzmichov recounts 
that Colonel Shchefetilnikov and other officers described how he had 
tortured a ten-year-old girl. He also told how his soldiers had raped 
women every day, and this account was gotten accurately straight from 
the Colonel.
Centurion Zhivodyarov, who has a lot of Jewish suffering on his 
conscience, stole a cow from a Jew and sold it for 22,000 “Nikolayev” 
rubles. Cavalry Capt. Kundo loaded onto his wagon six fox pelts, a 
gold watch, and other things that he had plundered from Jews. Capt. 
Podshivalov (of the 4th Company) took a piano in his wagon. Ensign 
Inzhuarov made it a specialty to rob doctors. He bragged to the above-
mentioned Dr. B that he had made 400,000 rubles just from the dental 
instruments that he had plundered. Cornet Bandarenko would ride 
into town dressed as a civilian to facilitate his robberies. He told Dr. 
B. that wounded Jews should be killed, not treated. There were cases 
of plundering by officers whose cynicism was really unbelievable. In 
Cherkasy an officer of the Volunteer Army was quartered at the home of 
Israel Halpern. He was friendly to the family and would often eat with 
them. But as the Volunteer Army was retreating from Cherkasy, the very 
same officer plundered them completely, gun in hand. In Kremenchug a 
colonel even dragged away his host’s furniture. 
But the officers were not always enthusiastic plunderers. Sometimes 
they could be convinced to make a deal, and for a sum of money they 
would protect Jewish homes and shops from the pogrom. For the right 
bribe he would offer to protect the home and the shop from the pogrom. 
There were even whole groups of officers who did this. In Zolotonosha 
the Jews paid officers from the commander’s guard 15,000 rubles per 
night, and they watched over many Jewish homes and stores. The same 
thing happened in Shpola. Officers were guarding there with one named 
Usov at the head. Similarly in Kiev, in Fastiv, and elsewhere. 
“Contributions”: Legal Robbery 
Officers sometimes committed another kind of robbery, “legal” one 
could say. That was extortion, usually the privilege of the highest level 
of the Volunteer Army, the commanders and the garrison chiefs. Here is 
how they did it. While soldiers and lower officers “worked” the Jewish 
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houses in a town, the commander or the garrison chief would send for 
the rabbi and the head of the community council and advised them 
“kindly” to bring a “gift” for the Volunteer Army. Sometimes he would 
be more honest and say that the Jews must pay such-and-such ransom 
money, to be paid within a day or two. There was some negotiating, and 
they would come to an understanding. That was how it was done in 
most cities. On December 22, 1919 (January 4, 1920) in Krivoye-Ozero, 
Dekonsky, the commander of the Volchanska Partisans, sent a written 
announcement, to this effect: “Inasmuch as the Jews have not helped the 
Volunteer Army at all, they have until the 24th to collect 200,000 rubles 
and 25 pairs of boots.” He did not keep his word. On the 24th he took 
the money, but still launched a horrendous pogrom in which more than 
600 people were murdered.
The worse the violence, the more Jews were willing to pay. And 
the more money the Volunteer Army earned from the activities of 
their commanders and garrison chiefs, the greater the ransom that was 
demanded. There was an instance in Lozovaya (Yekaterinoslav province) 
in which the commandant, in a great rage, first refused to hear of any 
“blood-stained Jewish money.” But he soon let himself be talked into 
accepting the “gift” of 50,000 rubles. When enthusiasm grew for pogroms 
among the lower ranks, it was an opportunity for the higher-ups to 
demand “presents” a second and a third time for the Volunteer Army, 
which was shedding blood for the good of Russia (in Bobrovytsia, Borzna, 
Fastiv, from Rabbi Braslavsky, and elsewhere). The “contributions” were 
extortion money “so that no pogrom should take place” (in Vasilikov 
and elsewhere); or “so that the pogrom should be stopped” (for 200,000 
in Pryluk); or “so that they should stop setting the fires” (for 500,000 
in Talne); or “so that the killings should stop, but there’s no guarantee 
against robbery” (Commandant Runtsev’s words in Fastiv). 
The Jews learned to fear the Volunteer Army and to give the 
required “gifts.” But it was no protection against plunder and murder. 
The pogroms did not abate, nor did they end. They were given brutal 
warnings: “If not, then…” In Novy-Malyn, for example, even after 
the pogrom, the commander demanded 200,000 rubles. If not, then he 
would drown them all in the river. 
Counter-espionage also took its share. In Pryluk, Palekha, the head of 
counter-espionage, demanded 250,000 rubles, in addition to the 200,000 
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that the commandant had extorted. If not, then there would be a pogrom. 
The militias, too, wanted their share. In Stepanets, Pampushka-Burlak, 
a well-known bandit whom the Volunteer Army had named chief of 
police, kept demanding “contributions.” His deputy, Borbatenko, did 
likewise. 
The Volunteer Army demanded not only money but clothes. 
In Konotop, for example, the commandant demanded 200 pairs of 
underwear. In Horodyshche they extorted 10,000 rubles worth of beef 
and chicken. The commander in Mykhailivka (Kharkiv province) 
surpassed all the others in his greed. He summoned Zelbet, the head 
of the Jewish community council, and ordered him to deliver 200,000 
rubles in cash, a gold watch, two imported travel suitcases, two pairs of 
ladies’ slippers size 39, two pairs of ladies’ stockings, pepper, candles, 
tobacco, matches, etc. In addition, before he left town, he ordered Zelbet 
(as well as Limin and Vinitsky, who had already been plundered), to 
write a note certifying that the Volunteer Army had treated the Jews 
honorably, and that the Jews were happy with them. 
You may well be asking yourself: Can all of this really be true about 
the officers of the Volunteer Army? Could it be really possible that there 
were not ten righteous men in this Sodom… honorable, upstanding, 
decent men who had joined the Army for idealistic reasons? If there 
were, then they should have upheld the honor and the very existence of 
the Army itself, and stood up for the Jews in their bleakest days of death 
and shame. But where were they? 
It must be said that our people warmly hold in their hearts the 
memory of those who were decent and compassionate. We do not only 
remember the atrocities, but we create legends about our friends, about 
those who looked kindly on us. In almost every town we remember 
Christians who took the part of the Jews, those who hid them in their 
homes, and those who said a good word for us in those black days of 
calamity, and we bless them. But among these “righteous among the 
nations” you will rarely find the name of an officer. In Fastiv they tell of 
an officer named Ilyushin who protected several Jews (although some 
say he was paid for it). There is a report of three officers who warned the 
Jews in the village Gogolenko of the approach of soldier-criminals, and 
advised them to hide their best things. There is a story of an officer who 
tried to stop soldiers during the slaughter in Boyarka, and it is painfully 
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recalled how he was insulted for it. There are very few instances. You 
can count them on your fingers. 
During this entire period we did not hear of a single group of officers 
who protested against the pogroms. People are more apt to exaggerate 
the good and the honorable, than to point a finger. But if they remain 
silent, that means that aside from the few cases mentioned above, there 
is nothing to discuss. If there was indeed a group of officers who treated 
Jews better in their hearts, but not in the open, then they were silent, 
either out of fear or small-mindedness. They stood quietly to the side 
and let the overwhelming number of criminal officers lead the way, 
without protesting, without complaining, and their names will be 
dishonored and cursed for generations to come.
Self-Defense
Jews, especially the youth, have long realized that during the constant 
state of warfare in Ukraine, they could only count on themselves for 
their lives, their dignity, and their few possessions, and only with a 
rifle in hand. Furthermore, self-defense was a question of honor among 
the Jewish youth. Ukrainian Jews in self-defense sacrificed many lives, 
among them the youngest and the best. Which doesn’t mean that it was 
effective.32 All the regimes were helpless against the countryside, which 
was armed from head to toe. None of them succeeded in removing 
the weapons, however they might try. By contrast, it was very easy to 
disarm the cities, and that was what each regime did right away. 
But Petliura’s regime did seize the few weapons held by Jews. They 
constantly searched Jewish homes for weapons, an excuse, by the way, 
to rob and commit violent acts. Needless to say, after so many searches, 
Jews were left with very few weapons. Nevertheless, groups of Jewish 
youth managed to arm themselves, sometimes as part of the city guard, 
sometimes as Jewish self-defense groups. Such groups could fight back 
aginst a gang but were not in a position fend off a pogrom army, and 
most of them were killed, victims of their idealism and weakness. 
32  The day on which the Volunteer Army entered Kiev, 18/31 August 1919, they 
murdered 37 Jewish youth who were members of the city guard, in the most brutal 
way. But it must be noted that Petliura’s army had also entered Kiev, and retreated 
before the Volunteer Army a day later [note by the author].
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There was no lack of provocation. In Horodyshche after the Soviets 
left on 3/16 August, a town guard was formed with 50 Jews and 20 
Christians, which lasted several days. On 9/22 August a train transport 
of Cossacks arrived from Smila, headed by Lieutenant Captain Svetsky. 
A gang of 12 Cossacks entered the town and began plundering. An 
appeal was made to Svetsky, who was standing at the train station with 
the rest of the Cossacks, and he replied, “Those are not my Cossacks. 
Those are bandits in disguise.” Then the town guard shot into the air 
and the “bandits” ran away. Two hours later Svetsky came into town 
to complain that they had shot at his Cossacks, and he demanded that 
they surrender their weapons. The guard hesitated, arguing that the 
countryside was full of gangs, and that as soon as the Volunteer Army 
left, there would certainly be a massacre. To which Svetsky gave “his 
word as a Russian officer” that no harm would come to the town. The 
guard surrendered 50 rifles, and immediately the Cossacks launched a 
pogrom that lasted 9 days.
In Korsun after the first pogrom (26/13 August) by the Volunteer 
Army, the authorities gave permission for Jews to organize a self-
defense unit. In the middle of December, as the Volunteer Army began 
to retreat, the officer guard began to plunder. The Jewish self-defense 
unit drove them off and thing quieted down. Soon after that a unit of the 
Volchanska Partisans rode into town. They disarmed the self-defense 
unit, and then proceeded to launch a pogrom unimpeded.
Incidentally, in those places where Jewish youth had somehow 
miraculously held on to their weapons, a strong resistance was put up 
against the soldier-criminals. In Steblev (Kiev province) the Jewish self-
defense fought the Cossacks, and narrowly drove them out of town. 
Later they fought off an attack by 400 criminals under Ataman Tuz, and 
in the process took 3 machine guns, rifles, ammunition, etc. When the 
Volunteer Army was retreating from the area, the self-defense protected 
the town, and stopped them from entering.
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IV. The Causes of the Pogroms.  
Pogroms as Part of the Military and Political 
Program. The Connection to the High Command
We have seen that pogroms were the rule, not the exception, for the 
Volunteer Army. They were a constant during their entire quest, from its 
first speedy victories to its shameful defeat. It was an essential element 
of their style of warfare. Where, then, did that come from? What were 
the deep motives that drove a large army to plunder and slaughter, 
indeed an army that was going to “save Russia” and establish “law 
and order,” and which, furthermore, was led by veteran, experienced 
generals, exemplars of military discipline? What was its connection to 
the methods of war, its requirements, or its objective?
Opportunities for Pogroms
First, what were the opportunities? The conditions were longstanding, 
psychological, with deep roots. By contrast, the opportunities were 
just a detail, the accident of chance in a given place at a given time, 
for example, the relations between the Jews and the Volunteer Army, 
the local history, the disputes, etc. — any of which might lead them to 
commit a pogrom in a particular place. If we pay close attention to the 
way in which pogroms occurred and how they developed, it becomes 
clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases there was no obvious 
trigger for the pogrom. We must note again that they occurred as soon 
as military units entered a town, before there were any relations with 
the Jewish community and any possible conflict. Furthermore, in many 
instances the pogrom started with the Jewish delegation that came to 
welcome the Volunteer Army with bread and salt. 
In some cases the blame was placed on rumors that were spread — as 
a provocation — that the Jews had shot at the Volunteer Army. Those 
were instances when the Army had to retreat before the Reds for a 
few days (sometimes for just a few hours, as in Korsun, for example), 
56 The Pogroms in Ukraine, 1918–19
and then returned to take the town. This occurred in Borzna, Niezhyn, 
Novy-Malyn, Fastiv, Kiev, and elsewhere. No less than a Volunteer 
Army commander reported, in an official communication, that Jews 
had shot at the Army when it was retreating from Novy-Malyn. And he 
said, by the way, that “measures had been taken” against them. It is not 
difficult to guess what he meant by that. 
Osvag, the official propaganda organ, had no qualms about spreading 
this story of “Jewish shooting” in Kiev on October 14/19, when a small 
Bolshevik military unit of the Irpen detachment broke through and there 
was fighting in the streets. But even if this story about “Jewish shooting” 
in a few places had been true, would that have justified pogroms in 
all of Ukraine, where there were no such reports? Not only that, but 
there are facts, and even a report of a special investigation, that totally 
demolish the entire myth of Jewish shooting. On the days of the terrible 
Kiev pogrom, on 17–20 of October 1919, an official Kiev newspaper, 
Vecherniye Ogni, reported, in a series of issues (No. 38, 39, and 40) carried 
the story of the “Jewish shooting.” But a number of centrist, and even 
conservative organizations (the Union for the Regeneration of Russia, 
the National Center, the National Union, the Teachers’ Union, the 
City Association, and others) researched the “facts” in that report, and 
concluded that they had been completely fabricated, and not very well 
at that. Let us consider one of those “facts,” No. 13. The newspaper said 
this: “On 3/16 October, four Jews and one Christian shot from the roof 
at No. 18 Kreshchatik Street. They were brought down from the roof 
and shot.” Here is what the investigators reported: “The house at No. 18 
Kreshchatik Street is the Kiev City Hall. The press office of the City Hall 
sent a letter to the editor of Vecherniye Ogni. It is evident from that letter 
that after 2/15 October Volchanska Partisans33 occupied the City Hall 
and hung the Russian National flag from the balcony. And that same 
day they already had a mess hall organized in the City Hall. Therefore 
it is totally out of the question that people were shooting from the roof 
on 3/16.” The investigators rejected all the other “facts” with the same 
kind of proof. 
This refutation was posted in Kiev on all the light-poles, but Vecherniye 
Ogni did not apologize. Furthermore, General Dragomirov appointed a 
33  This was a military unit infamous for its pogrom massacres in Korsun, Fastiv, and 
other towns [note by the author].
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special commission headed by Senator Guliayev to again investigate the 
matter, and that commission, too, found absolutely nothing to confirm 
the story of “Jewish shooting.” And not out of love for the Jews.
The myth of shootings in Novy-Malyn was no more believable. About 
70 Jewish families lived there among Christians. During the fighting 
between the Volunteer Army and the Bolsheviks for that town, there 
was heavy firing of artillery and machine guns. Jews and Christians 
would hide in the cellars of each others’ houses. During the last volleys, 
just before the Volunteer Army took over the city, Jews went to hide 
with Christians, because at that time the shooting was in the Jewish part 
of town, which lies along the Dniester River. The Bolsheviks, who still 
held the town, went into the abandoned Jewish homes and fired from 
there. A delegation of Christians later went to the commander of the 
Volunteer Army and attested that the Jews had had nothing to do with 
the shooting.
There was even a special “certification” from their Christian neighbors 
on 2/15 October, which they gave to the Jews, which stated: “We, the 
undersigned residents of Novy-Malyn, attest that what was written in 
Kievlyanin No. 21, 14/27 November, is not true. The Jews in town did 
no harm to the Volunteer Army and did not shoot at them.” They also 
confirmed that relations were good between Jews and Christians, and 
that Jews had not been active in Soviet institutions. The certification 
was signed by homeowner Grigory Ivanovich Filipenko; postmaster 
Yushchenko; Aleksander and Peter Khonak; a teacher, Yelisina; and 
others, including several councilmen from the City Hall. The mayor 
confirmed the signatures. 
It was the same with the “shootings” in Fastiv and elsewhere. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that in all these cases the pogrom had 
been organized in advance, secretly planned even before the beginning 
of the war. Residents of Kiev, both Christians and Jews, who had fled 
the city on October 14th with the Volunteer Army before the advancing 
Bolsheviks report that in Darnitsa, the nearest village, they heard 
nonstop agitation for a pogrom in Kiev. That was before any talk of 
“Jewish shooting,” and before anyone had been “taken from the roof 
with machine guns.”
There are likewise reports about Fastiv during the days when the 
Volunteer Army was still retreating before the Bolsheviks to the nearest 
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village, Kozhanka. They report, in the name of Dr. Snisarenko, who 
retreated with the Second Terek Plastun Brigade, that the commander 
of the brigade, Belogortsev, had promised to “hand over Fastiv” to the 
Cossacks, who would take the town.
It is clear. The fabrications about “Jewish shooting” or that that they 
cried “Hurrah” in honor of the oncoming Bolsheviks, as in Fastiv, were 
nothing more than pretexts. It is evident that in all these towns the 
pogroms had actually started before the Volunteer Army was forced 
to retreat, in fact as soon as it had entered the town. And that was how 
they occurred everywhere. The slaughter only worsened after the myths 
about the shootings were spread. 
The stories are all the more suspect when they are repeated after the 
pogrom not by the Army that committed it, but by those who feel the 
need to defend them, for they understand what a terrible impression it 
makes on the larger world at a time when the civil war is complicated by 
international interests. If they wish to excuse a pogrom with the myth of 
“Jewish shooting,” then they have answer the question, what came first, 
the myth or the pogrom? Who is it that needs the pretext? Do the Cossacks 
need it, when they drive in with their wagons and signs reading, “Murder 
the Jews and Save Russia?” This is clear: Chance is not important. What is 
important is that it is always easier to perpetrate a pogrom where there is 
already an established tradition. The causes run much deeper.
The Volunteer Army
The Volunteer Army consisted mostly of volunteers, partisans. They 
tried a draft, but the population would not go along and little came of 
it. The two main features of the Army were an abundance of officers 
who had fled Soviet Russia, and far too many Cossacks, especially 
Asian horsemen of various savage tribes: Chechens, Ossetians, etc. K. N. 
Sokolov, a member of Denikin’s dictatorship and a minister in his regime, 
who recently published a book, The Regime of General Denikin (Sofia, 1921), 
writes about the Army: “We were in a bad way. Our military strength 
lay in the Kuban Cossacks who were under the demagogic influence 
of the plague of Black Hundred Ukrainian nationalists (supporters of 
Cossack Ukrainian separatism). The Russians gave us Bolsheviks, half-
Leninist youth, or moderate supporters of ‘Revolutionary Democracy.’ 
We relied militarily on the Cossacks. It was not for nothing that General 
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Denikin had written in August 1918 to the Kuban Ataman, ‘It is certain 
that only the Cossack and mountain (Caucasus) people have the right 
to rule themselves, because they have resisted their enemies and their 
murderers.’” (p. 57)
These were the wild Cossacks and tribes of the Caucasus. Their 
officers were so numerous in the Volunteer Army that they comprised 
entire military units, and their generals headed companies. V. V. Shulgin, 
editor of Kievlyanin, an insider and a superbly informed man, recounts 
enthusiastically that when the Volunteer Army was passing through 
Kiev on October 14/19, no less than supreme commander General 
Dragomirov stopped soldiers and cadets who were deserting on the 
suspension bridge and ordered them to return to the battle against the 
Bolsheviks.
We have an authoritative reading of the situation with the Army — its 
officers, and the half-wild tribes — at the time when they penetrated deep 
into Ukraine, from its commander-in-chief, General Denikin himself. On 
July 26 (August 8) 1919, at 2 o’clock there came a Jewish delegation to 
see him at Rostov-on-Don. Among the delegation were representatives 
of these communities: M. S. Bruk from Yekaterinoslav; Dr. L. B. Vilensky 
from Kharkiv; Dr. Z. Goldenberg from Rostov; Dr. A. I. Yevinson from 
Taganrog. The delegation had come to complain of the violence that the 
Cossacks were perpetrating in the Kharkiv and Yekaterinoslav provinces. 
To which General Denikin responded: “Yes, no good at all can come from 
people of such low character. These aren’t the people who joined the 
Volunteer Army for an ideal, these are just dregs.”34 
But if it was neither ideals nor compulsion, then what drove “people 
of such low character” to attempt such a risky endeavor as “to save 
Russia?” Was it high wages, perhaps, or good working conditions? 
Certainly not! K. N. Sokolov, who is supremely well-informed about 
this, explains the upkeep of the Army: “We always maintained the Army 
poorly. We paid it poorly and clothed them poorly. Leaders at the front 
received exactly the same paltry change as the officials in the rear. But 
since the Army was on the move, and, furthermore, there was a shortage 
of paper currency, they often received no pay at all. When it came to 
34  The Jewish delegation recorded this conversation with General Denikin and sent 
it straight to the Editorial Board along with other documents on the pogrom in the 
Kharkiv community. To my knowledge it has not been published before [note by 
the author].
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clothing, that was also terrible… By the Fall (of 1919) it was already 
obvious that the Army would freeze in the Winter” (p. 192). We hear the 
same from another source, no less authoritative on this matter, and who 
was closely tied to the Volunteer Army, with its supreme commanders, 
and its political leaders. We are referring to V. V. Shulgin’s article “Two 
Armies” in Kievlyanin No. 67, 13/26 November. Shulgin compares 
the Bolsheviks and the Volunteer Army. When he writes about the 
Volunteer Army he pretends to be neutral, but it is clear that he is quite 
bitter.
V. Shulgin would have us believe that “the aim of the Volunteer 
Army is — to protect and save the peaceful working people from the 
awful rule of do-nothings who took power by the gun.” From which 
he concludes: “In that case, the Volunteer Army would necessarily 
have disintegrated if it had to depend on plunder for its livelihood.” 
The prophetic accuracy of this observation becomes even clearer, when 
Shulgin explains the source of this “livelihood:” “Of course, it would not 
have occurred to anyone to plunder if the Army had gotten everything 
that it deserved, if it didn’t have to freeze and starve. Just ask, and you 
will hear the plain truth, that the tradition of plunder grows largely out 
of bitter needs.”
K. N. Sokolov writes more frankly about the “livelihood” of the 
Volunteer Army: “Moving back away from the front line, anyone who 
could do so would take care of business by making money dishonestly. 
On the front things were even simpler. “Appropriated Property”35 
(appropriating what the soldiers had plundered) became integral to the 
way of life of our Army at a time when plundered property was its main 
source — if not its only source — of livelihood. 
But in addition to this kind of “Appropriated Property,” which was 
considered lawful, and for which an account had to be given, another 
kind of “Appropriated Property” developed: plain robbery, committed 
by individuals and groups. We would hear reports, usually far from 
the front, of individuals and military units amassing huge quantities of 
goods. Once in Rostov in the winter, we saw a popular military leader 
traveling on a train to get some rest with his young officers. It was a 
gigantic train with dozens of cars loaded with merchandise, sugar, and 
35  ‘Realdov’ in Russian, an abbreviation for ‘voenno realzatsiia dobychi’, meaning 
appropriating what the military has seized from the enemy [note by the author].
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all kinds of other things. The tracks of the Rostov train station were busy 
with it for quite a while.” (pp. 193–94) 
Shulgin sees the solution to those “bitter needs” this way: “It is better 
to have a smaller army, well equipped with everything that it needs, 
than a larger army that depends on its livelihood in the manner of 
Wallenstein, from plunder.”36 Because, predicts Shulgin, “such an army 
will not last for long.” So we have it from the highest authorities, the 
most devoted friends of the Volunteer Army, that two of its prominent 
features were: 1. It is “people of low character” who joined it, not 
motivated by ideals (and not mobilized against their will). 2) This was 
an army that equipped itself “in the manner of Wallenstein,” meaning 
by plundering. This helps us understand why the Volunteer Army 
attracted a lowly element who were often nothing more than bandits 
like I. T. Struk, for example.
It is worth exploring the career of this fine young man in the 
Volunteer Army. Ilya Timofeyevich Struk, a peasant from the village of 
Griny in the Hornostapol district of the Kiev province, went to a village 
school and began his military career in 1917, during the period of the 
Central Rada. He organized a unit of the Vil’na Kozatstvo,37 that is to say 
of the Ukrainian National Army. He was no longer needed during the 
period of the Hetman under the German occupation (March–November 
1918), so he turned to speculation and counterfeiting, and the police 
were looking for him. 
When the Ukrainian Directorate revolted against the Hetmanate 
(November–December 1918) he formed a military partisan unit, extorted 
“contributions,” and openly robbed Jews in the Hornostapol-Chernobyl 
region. Incidentally, he murdered a postal service official in the town 
of Malyn at the beginning of January 1919. The Malyn commandant 
arrested Struk and sent him off to Kiev, and there he was released. The 
Bolsheviks were then starting to fight against the Directorate. Struk 
sided with the Bolsheviks and published a Bolshevik manifesto aimed 
at the peasants. 
He was sent to the front with his unit, and there, in his first battle, 
he betrayed the Bolsheviks and again sided with the Ukrainians. From 
36  Albrecht von Wallenstein organized mercenary troops for Emperor Ferdinand II 
during the Thirty Years’ War. 
37  Russian: Free Cossacks, Ukrainian nationalist militia.
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then on he and his men repeatedly committed pogroms for 9 months 
in Hornostapol, Chernobyl, and elsewhere, with this slogan: “Murder 
Jews! Save Soviet power without communes!” Then the Volunteer 
Army took Kiev. 
For General Bredov, military chief of the Volunteer Army in the 
Kiev region, it was no obstacle to welcome this criminal into the Army. 
They asked Struk to organize “the first Little Russia partisan military 
unit,” and crowned him Colonel in September 1919.38 General Bredov 
knew perfectly well who Struk was. He received a written report on 
him from a Christian, Melnichenko, who knew Struk extremely well. 
In addition, he was informed by Professor Odinets, who was chairman 
of the regional committee of the Union for the Regeneration of Russia, 
and who possessed all the materials concerning Struk’s atrocities, 
including his published pogrom proclamations. Struk’s new allies did 
not interfere with his usual pogrom activities. For an entire winter, he 
and his gang — now in the guise of Russian patriots — terrorized the 
Jewish residents of Podol (Kiev province) and extorted “contributions” 
again and again. When the Volunteer Army retreats from Kiev, we 
find Struk in Odessa, where he continues to terrorize and plunder 
Jews. He called this a “peasant military unit” of the Volunteer Army 
in January 1920.39 
Now we can begin to understand the kernel of truth when Cossacks 
and Chechens — those saviors of Russia — say that they were “permitted 
to go wild for three days.” Such an army required some compensation if 
they were to obey orders and go into battle. What better compensation 
could they be given than to give them free reign over populated towns, 
or at least some people? We have already noted that when Belogortsev, 
commander of the Second Terek Plastun Brigade, wanted to motivate 
his Cossacks to “liberate” Fastiv, he “handed them the town.” A Jewish 
delegation in Kremenchug, one of many like it, which came to plead to 
stop a pogrom, told the commander that the military leaders had let the 
Cossacks go wild for three days. The commander in Horodyshche said 
the same: We let the Cossacks go wild for 48 hours, “for our purposes.” 
And the same was reported of other commanders and garrison chiefs.
38  See the newspaper Kievskaya Rus, No. 5, 25 November 1919 [note by the author].
39  Struk’s proclamation on this was published in the newspaper Odeski Listak, No. 14, 
15/28 January 1920 [note by the author].
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Shulgin was right on both counts, both when he valued the Volunteer 
Army for taking care of its own needs and when he predicted its failure. 
His prophesy came true, that such an army would not last long, and it 
failed much sooner than he had thought. It became evident right in the 
pogroms. The lack of discipline went so far that when two soldiers of 
the Ismailov regiment began to strip Jews in Pryluk in the street in the 
middle of the day, and an officer ordered them to let the Jews go, one 
of the soldiers shot the officer. There were similar reports from Bila-
Tserkava, Boyarka, and elsewhere.
We will see later why, when a town was handed over to the Cossacks, 
the Jews were being targeted. But even what we have already noted is 
sufficient to come to one conclusion: If in Novy-Malyn the Cossacks say 
that they were “permitted to go wild for three days,” then that is a much 
more frank, accurate, and convincing explanation for the pogrom than 
to say that it was because Jews had been shooting at the Army. 
We have already noted two prominent aspects of the Volunteer 
Army: the “dregs” and its livelihood “in the manner of Wallenstein,” 
which is to say by plundering. That was the economic need underlying 
of their pogroms. But an ideology was also necessary, because that 
economic need, if unchecked, might go too far. “After plundering the 
Jewish population, they started to rob Russians, too,” complained 
Colonel Sakharov, garrison chief in Bila-Tserkava, in his order number 
10 of 1/14 October. That is why he commanded them to stop the 
pogrom. It was too dangerous to allow it free rein, without restraint 
or regulation. For its own survival, the Army had to take control of its 
“bitter needs” by limiting it in a specific way. It dawned on them that 
with certain regulations the “bitter needs” could be exploited for the 
military objective of the Volunteer Army, which was the war against 
Bolshevism.
They needed an ideology that would link “Beat the Jews!” to “Save 
Russia!” — meaning the struggle against the Bolsheviks. It was not 
necessary to look hard for such an ideology or to dream one up. It was 
easy to find, already fully formed, in the old Tsarist regime, especially 
in its attitude towards Jews during the World War. Who didn’t already 
know that the Jews were the enemies of Russia, that the Jews had 
betrayed the Russian Army, etc.?
To our knowledge the first indication of this ideology of the 
Volunteer Army dates from the end of November 1918, when the Army 
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was just starting to be organized. They were just getting ready for the 
actual war, and in the meantime it was not actually campaigning for 
Russia, but for recognition of themselves and sympathy from those 
who sought someone to “save” Russia. First of all they needed to make 
clear to them what a victory of the Volunteer Army would mean, and 
secondly, who the enemies of Russia were against whom they were 
waging war. Apparently that was the purpose of the proclamation, “A 
Call to the Russian People from the Army of the South,”40 signed by “the 
Army of the South,” 24 November (7 December) 1918, Rostov-on-Don. 
That appeal starts with the second point: the enemy. Here it explains at 
length “what Socialism and Bolshevism have done to the people.” It says 
that “Russia has failed the Allies. Everything is ruined, destroyed,” etc. 
And who is to blame? Here is the answer: “They, the kikes — Bronstein 
(Trotsky), Nakhamkes (Steklov), Tsederboym (Martov), Goldman 
(Gorev), Kirbis (Kerensky), Lieberman (Chernov) — have no interest in 
Russia or in Russia’s welfare. They dream and strive to ruin Russia and 
to render the Russian people helpless before their sworn enemies and 
plunderers.”
The proclamation repeatedly stresses the unique ability of the 
Jews to devastate Russia: “In order to better deceive the people (the 
Russians),” says the proclamation, “they have even changed their 
names: Layb Bronstein took the family name Trotsky, Lieberman took 
the name Chernov, Kirbis calls himself Kerensky,” etc. “In addition to 
material ruination, they, the Bronshayns, the Nakhamkes, and others, 
have debased the spirit of the people.” These “kikes” have “swindled” 
the people and conspired to bring about complete ruination and 
destruction, etc. In addition, they have incited the people to “beat the 
priests and throw out holy images (icons).” And instead of one Tsar, 
they have installed many little emperors, some of them Jews, to boot.” 
That was point 2: the enemy.
Point 1, the purpose, is explained this way: “They (the kikes) say that 
robbing the landowners and ruining them is the same as if they ruined 
themselves. First of all, our landowners are our own, Russians, members 
of the Russian people. Secondly, they worked the land better, gave the 
people and the government better food, better cattle, better produce… 
They say, ‘Let’s divide up the land (of the landowners), but they don’t 
40  Russian: Golos k Russkomu narodu ot Iuzhnoi Armii.
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say how much land each person could get. And there is really very little 
privately-owned land — and none at all in many places — which means 
that there is nothing to divide up…” The “Army of the South” appeals 
wholeheartedly to the Russian Orthodox people: “Stop selling your 
souls to the kikes! Throw off the yoke of the kikes.” 
So we can summarize the program of the “Army of the South” this 
way: 1. Its purpose: the lands of the landowners may not be touched 
because a) they are “our own people” and b) they have nothing to be 
taken (“they have little land”). 2. Its enemy: the “kikes” and only the 
“kikes,” Chernov and the others, whom the world takes for Russians 
but who are really “kikes” in disguise. The “kikes” strive to destroy 
Russia, and they tear down the Orthodox Church. 3. Its means: throw 
off the yoke of the “kikes.”
But they were not very strict about their program, and they played 
down parts of it in certain regions, especially the part about the property 
of the landowners. In the Don and Kuban region, in the southern 
steppes, where the peasants have plenty of land, they could say what 
they dared not say in Ukraine, where the vast majority of peasants had 
no land, particularly after the Soviet regime took the land away from 
the landowners, and the peasants would not give it back. The generals 
understood this, and we see, indeed, that they talked much less in 
Ukraine about privately-held land, and they even told them to appease 
that hunger for land. 
On the subject of agrarian reform and other social and political 
programs, the Volunteer Army reflected the views of those who wished 
to restore the Tsarist monarchy and return to the “old regime” — that 
was evident in many ways. But within the bounds of our present work at 
hand we must limit ourselves to the essentials. The best witness for the 
social and political plans of the Volunteer Army is certainly the much-
quoted K. N. Sokolov, one of the creators of those plans. He certainly 
would not wish to besmirch those plans. This is what he says in his 
book, General Denikin’s Government: “We wished to address the question 
of land properly, honestly, with justice and fairness. On 24 March 1919, 
General Denikin wrote in his memo on the question of land that first 
of all, ‘THE OWNERS RETAIN THE RIGHT TO THEIR LAND. THAT 
MEANS THAT WE WILL RETURN TO THE LANDOWNERS WHAT 
IS THEIRS BY RIGHT.’” (emphasis by N. Shtif) 
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K. N. Sokolov himself did not agree with that plan: “We may 
consider the seizure of that land ‘immoral,’ but it must be legalized, 
because it is ‘politically necessary.’” Sokolov interprets Denikin’s plan 
in such a way as to turn it into a legal maneuver: “To placate the rights 
of the aggrieved, the landowners may make a claim to be compensated 
for the land that was seized.” This was indeed a fine interpretation, but 
he admits that “in practice, they returned the land to the landowners 
by force (p. 287). There were terrible instances when we supported the 
landowners and routed the peasants (p. 187). But a little further on, we 
hear, not about “terrible instances,” but about a government program. 
“At the end of June 1919 (when the Army began to move quickly 
deep into Ukraine) regulations were issued concerning grass land. 
The government promised half the crop to the owners and half to the 
peasants, and as for compensation, the peasants would get two thirds 
and the owners one third, etc. (p. 188) 
That was how they dealt with agrarian reform “properly and with 
fairness.” It was even worse when it came to the issue of labor. Sokolov 
himself admitted that it was a lost cause: “The labor issue for us was 
fundamentally lost. We could not make the workers happy… simply 
because we could not regulate life… furthermore we were counting on 
the peasants, not the workers” (p. 186). And we have already seen how 
they satisfied the peasants.
Finally, on the national question. K. N. Sokolov, who was considered 
radical on the land issue by his fellow ministers, was rigid on this 
issue: “With whom have we been constantly and openly at odds? The 
Ukrainian political groups of the Samostina-Petliura stripe.”41 One 
might think that they had tried to reach an agreement with other, 
more moderate Ukrainian political groups. But Sokolov leaves no 
room for doubt. He often says, “With our overly-rigid political stand 
on the question of Ukraine, we repelled even the moderate circles of 
Ukrainian society that supported a federation with Russia” (p. 283). 
Now everyone knows exactly what their political stand was. They 
carved Ukraine into three separate regions (Kiev, Kharkiv, and New 
Russia), and they gave it to “the government” of General Dragomirov 
and his mentor, V. Shulgin, that Ukraine-hater. Right in the very first 
issue of Kievlyanin Shulgin explained: “Yes, this region is Russian… We 
41  The Ukrainian independence movement.
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will not cede it to the Ukrainian traitors who have ruined it, and not 
to the Jewish hangmen who have drenched it in blood” in Kievlyanin 
No. 1, 21 August/3 September 1919. They even expunged the name 
“Ukraine,” which they once again referred to as “Little Russia.” In his 
appeal to the “Little Russians,” General Denikin promised them “a 
unified, indivisible Russia” and a Tsarist Russian school. The “Little 
Russians” could also have schools in their mother tongue, if they 
wished… supported by private means. In short, they were throwing 
Ukraine back into the days of Nikolai I, before education minister 
Count Ignatiev.
Sokolov emphasizes the last part, and summing up, admits bitterly: 
“It was not easy… The intelligentsia did not trust us. The workers hated 
us. The peasants suspected us” (p. 168). For him to say “suspected” 
is an understatement. They revolted against the Volunteer Army 
with weapons. As the Army retreated, the peasants supported the 
Bolsheviks, Petliura, and other Atamans against the Army. It was above 
all the anarchist bandit Makhno who attracted them, and who roamed 
over all of our supreme commander Denikin’s territory, invading 
Yekaterinoslav, and taking over the most important train junctions, etc.” 
(p. 190)
That was the social and political program at the highest level, where 
political decisions were made. But for most of the officers, even that 
program was too “left,” too “Kadet.” There developed “a political rift 
between him — Denikin — and the officers of the Volunteer Army… 
General Denikin turned out “too leftist” for his army.” (p. 195) K. N. 
Sokolov qualifies this. He explains that “it would be unfair to consider 
the masses of officers ‘reactionaries’ or landowners themselves.” But 
he must admit that the “gradualist liberalism” which was permitted to 
grow, and partially approved, in Rostov and in Taganrog, was alien to 
the most activist (officers)” (p. 195). He is referring here to liberalism 
“for export.”42 
Both sides agreed on one thing: K. N. Sokolov says openly that 
“the masses of people, including the military, were infused with 
42  K. N. Sokolov often says that ‘liberalism’, and specifically the liberal declaration of 
March 1919 on the aims of the Volunteer Army, was ‘made for export’ (p. 123). ‘The 
representatives of the Entente at Headquarters made it clear to the High Command 
that we needed to have a liberal declaration to allay any suspicions concerning our 
reactionary aims’ [note by the author].
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anti-Semitism.” (pp. 103–04) The plan concerning the “kikes” was of 
prime importance to the Volunteer Army, considering such an ideology 
and such a program. Since its program was so full of omissions, the 
“kikes” could serve to fill in whenever agitation was needed. 
Pogrom Agitation
As soon as the Volunteer Army entered a town, orders against “the 
kike-commissars” would appear on the walls. The officers, like Count 
Urusov in Bobrovytsia, made speeches against the Jews at peasant 
gatherings (skhod) and elsewhere. They agitated against “the kikes” 
at full blast. The higher echelons were no better than the lower. In 
Kiev province, for example, they issued a “mobilization appeal to the 
peasants” in which they explained all about Bolshevism: “Now what 
kind of person was the Bolshevik leader Trotsky originally, if not the 
elegant Layb Bronstein, whom no respectable person would ever have 
permitted into his home? And now he is an extremely important person, 
and sits in Moscow instead of the Tsar!” (To the Peasants on Mobilization, 
25 October/7 November 1919). 
That appeal was also posted in Kiev, and was published in Kievlyanin 
and in the semi-official Narodnaya Gazeta. In official war communiqués 
the command accused the Jews of shooting at the Volunteer Army, 
which had caused their defeats (as in Novy-Malyn). And they alleged 
that Jews made up a large part of the Red Army, and fought the fiercest 
against the Volunteer Army.
General Bredov did the same, spreading the myth of “Jewish 
shooting” in a more subtle, disguised way. And he did it at the very 
worst time for the Jews of Kiev, the tragic days of 14/19 October 1919. 
There was indeed fighting with a small Bolshevik military unit in the 
streets of Kiev. There was constant incitement against the Jews. They 
were preparing a pogrom, and to that end they spread the rumor that 
Jews had fired on the Volunteer Army. On 17/18 October the Volunteer 
Army was victorious, and they launched a horrendous pogrom. At such 
a juncture, General Bredov issued an order that seemed to call for an 
end to it (5/18 October). But just what was in that order? This is how 
he calmed down the agitated Volunteer Army: “Volunteers! Be bold 
against the enemy, as well as the peaceful residents and the defeated 
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enemy: that will be to your credit.” It is not hard to discern who the 
“defeated enemy” was in Kiev. 
Mamontov, another prominent general, speaks more plainly, more 
coarsely. In September 1919, in his proclamation to the residents of the 
towns of Kozlov, Tambov, and Yelets, he said to the peasants: “Arm 
yourselves and rise up against our common enemy on Russian soil, the 
Jew — the Bolshevik — the Communist. Soon we will breathe free, free 
of the yoke of the Devil, which has enslaved us in shackles, destroyed 
our faith, our church… May we crush the power of the Devil that thrives 
in the hearts of the Judeo-Communists.”43 
Two themes were prominent in pogrom agitation: the persecution of 
the Orthodox Church and the Cherezvichayka.44 The “persecution” was 
cleverly fabricated to tap into the religious fanaticism of the ignorant 
masses, peasants and townspeople. We have already seen how General 
Mamontov did this. The prominent colonel, Struk, followed his example, 
when he said in his proclamation: “They close the churches, they tear 
down our holy icons” (Odessa, January 1920). “All the saints call on 
you in the ranks to force the Devil’s tribe (There is no doubt about this 
reference — N. S.) to allow Christians to live and believe freely” (Kiev, 
November 1919).
The Cherezvichayka, which was thoroughly hated by the people, was 
also blamed on the Jews. That was the surest way to inflame bloodthirsty 
impulses, second only to the persecution of the church, even among 
educated circles. Harrowing scenes played out in Kiev in the first days 
of the Volunteer Army. All someone had to do was to yell, “There he is, 
an agent of the Cherezvichayka!” and people would attack a person on 
the street and tear him to pieces. There were many victims who were 
murdered in the same way. Orders against such savagery were issued 
for world opinion. But in the meantime they were digging up buried 
corpses, and opening up hidden cellars — real and imagined — to 
show the world the atrocities of the Cheka. And they did this constantly 
blaming the Jews.
43  This proclamation was published by Col. Malone, Member of the English 
Parliament, in his book The Russian Republic. Our text is translated from the English 
[note by the author].
44  Cheka is an acronym of the Russian words ‘Extraordinary Commission’ for 
Combatting Counterrevolution, Speculation, etc. It was the secret political police of 
the Soviet Union.
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We have already noted that in his very first article in the new 
Kievlyanin, Shulgin had already identified the Jews as the Cheka, “The 
Jewish hangmen who have drenched (our country) in blood.” The 
“Jewish Cheka” was the most common theme in Kievlyanin and in pogrom 
agitation in general: “Trotsky is still running around on all the fronts, 
encouraging the bloody work of the Jewish Cherezvichayka” (Shulgin, in 
Kievlyanin No. 7, 10/28 September 1919). “The Trotskys, the Nakhamkes, 
the Rafes are waging war for equal rights, but they sentence people to 
death just because they are Russians.” ([Anatolii Invanovich] Savenko, 
in Kievlyanin No. 1, 21 August/3 September 1919); etc.
There was no lack of other propaganda for pogrom agitation in the 
Volunteer Army. They even blamed pogroms on the “kike-communists” 
themselves: Jews perpetrated pogroms on themselves so as to be able to 
put the blame them on the Volunteer Army and discredit it. So said 
the commander in Niezhyn, when he reported that “the plundering 
and the savagery was mostly committed by the Trotsky-Bronsteins, 
the Nakhamkes, and the other mercenaries” (Order no. 11, dated 12/25 
September 1919). 
In addition to the military command, other official institutions 
incited pogroms, the Osvag45 the semi-official press, individuals, and 
religious leaders. On July 26 (August 8) 1919, a Jewish delegation had 
already complained to General Denikin about the anti-Semitic agitation 
by the Osvag. They brought him such leaflets with titled, Workers, Red 
Army, and Everyone, Everyone. In the middle of Ukraine, in Kiev, they 
named as head of the Osvag the infamous Jew-hater Savenko who had 
been prominent in the Beilis trial.46 
If we wish to grasp what Osvag was, we can rely again on K. N. 
Sokolov. He was the head of Osvag, its leader. Sokolov recounts “with 
pride and joy” that some famous artists, scholars, and writers worked 
for Osvag, among them E. Grimm, the former rector of the University 
of Petersburg; and B. Engelgardt, former Deputy in the Duma and 
commander of the Tavrichesky47 Palace during the first days of the 
45  Abbreviation of the Russian Osvedomitel’noe Agenstvo [Information Agency], 
the official propaganda organ of the Volunteer Army. It was later called the Otdel’ 
Propagandy [Propaganda Department].
46  Menakhem Mendel Beilis was a Ukrainian Jew who was falsely accused of ritual 
murder in 1913.
47  Tauride.
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Revolution. But he admits that “we had in the provinces (in Osvag) 
mostly ignorant good-for-nothings and careerist parasites. There were 
people lacking in conscience, prone to criminality.” (p. 105) He says 
very guardedly that the naming of Savenko as chief of Osvag in Kiev 
“caused a great uproar and was objected to on many grounds.” (p. 174)
We can imagine how those “good-for-nothings” who were “prone 
to criminality” used their privileged positions to “enlighten” the 
population and the Army who were anti-Semitic through and through. 
In their proclamations, the words “kike” and “Communist” were one 
and the same. This is how they portrayed the Soviet regime in their 
artistic posters: A blood-red Devil, with Trotsky’s face, rules over an 
enslaved Russia, which is drenched in blood.
The Kiev Osvag distributed this general dispatch throughout the 
provinces (in Fastiv, Lubny, Smila, Chernihiv, and elsewhere) on the 
events of October 14/19: “With their guerilla shootings, the Jewish 
residents helped the Bogun Bolshevik regiment repel the Volunteer 
Army and retake part of Kiev… Military organizations from Jewish 
parties fired with machine guns and rifles, they threw hand grenades, 
they poured boiling water on the Volunteer Army… As soon as the 
Red Army took Kiev, they began to plunder and commit pogroms… 
Because the Jews took part en masse in the attack on Kiev, and the 
role that local Jews played in helping the Reds… a great rage has 
overtaken the Christian population, which the authorities are having 
great difficulty in subduing” (general dispatch, press bureau No. 17, 
dated 6/19 October, posted in many towns).48 Here they were not simply 
talking about “Jewish shootings” but about a military uprising against 
the Volunteer Army. And when was this accusation made? On 6/19 
October, which is to say, on the very day when in Kiev itself no one still 
believed the myth of “Jewish shootings,” and when General Bredov, 
the supreme commander of Kiev at the time, called for “mercy for the 
defeated enemy.”
What the military authority could not do openly it did through the 
hands of sympathetic friends. We have noted how the regime opened 
48  There is in the Archives of the Editorial Board on Pogrom Materials a printed copy 
of this dispatch, which was removed from a wall in Ostior (Chernihiv province). 
By an oversight of the censor, the dispatch was published in the Kiev Yiddish 
newspaper, Di velt [note by the author].
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up the cellars of the Cheka. And in Kievlyanin Shulgin accused “the 
Jewish hangmen.” Now the Jews would have to “drain their bitter cup 
of repentance.” Day in, day out, Kievlyanin, the spiritual guide of the 
Volunteer Army, spewed its poisonous incitement against the Jews, 
incessantly repeating its philosophy that Jews are Bolsheviks, that Jews 
are dangerous to Russia, and that there is only one solution: they should 
“publicly repent for their sins against Russia and leave Russia for good. 
If not, things would get worse. In his eyes the pogroms by the Volunteer 
army were nothing but a “Terror Inquisition.” The Russian people were 
terrorizing the Jews because they had ruined their country, and they 
were right to do so. 
With great talent he describes that terror and “the inhuman 
screams” during the night-time horrors (see the article cited above). 
But he does not accuse with the “people with knives” who are doing 
this, or their spiritual leaders. On the contrary, it is the Jews who 
should ask forgiveness. Here is how he ends the article: “The Russian 
people listen to those horrified screams and think to themselves, ‘Will 
they (the Jews) finally understand what it means to ruin a country, 
what it means to bring about equal rights at any price? Will they 
repent of their sins, cover their heads with ash, and do penance before 
the whole world because the children of Israel have wickedly joined in 
the Bolshevik dance of the Devil?’”
That is how Shulgin sees the pogroms, and he gives “the children of 
Israel” two alternatives. They can either have pogroms as their penance 
or the “Terror Inquisition,” which is to say a state of permanent pogrom 
without end. 
He repeats this demand again and again: the Jews should “repent,” 
they should “excise with their own hands those Jews who had supported 
both Revolutions” (Kievlyanin No. 38, 22 October/5 November 1919, and 
others). We have already noted the Cossack torture of hanging people 
to terrorize them into getting something from them. Now this approach 
had broadened into a complete campaign, a policy, an entire ideology. 
This approach had become the ideology of the Volunteer Army, which 
exalted and crowned its newspaper, Kievlyanin, which was circulated at 
no charge and was distributed throughout the Army.
But Shulgin was not alone. The humble Father of the Orthodox 
Church, Metropolitan Antony of Kiev, was the same. He himself 
recounts how he received a Jewish delegation which had come to plead 
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with him about the pogroms: “Representatives of the Jewish community 
came to ask me to publish a proclamation against pogroms. To which 
I responded that they should first make their coreligionists quit all 
Bolshevik institutions” (reported in an interview in Kievskaya Echo Nos. 
42–47, 28 October/20 November 1919).
All the commanders, garrison chiefs, etc. absorbed from the 
ideologues of the pogrom, both military and political, that the Jews 
were at their mercy. “You’ve suffered for 14 days. But how long have 
we suffered from you all this time? Get out!” was how Col. Karpov, 
garrison chief in Boryspil answered a Jewish delegation which had 
come to give him a “gift” of 30,000 rubles and to implore him to stop a 
pogrom that had lasted two weeks. In the final analysis the fundamental 
principle that underlies the theoretical campaign against the Jews can 
be summarized in the frank words of the “dregs,” the simple Cossack 
who said in Bogodukhov, “The Jews must be butchered.” And should 
you ask him why, he will answer in all innocence, “For kikes, no pretext 
is necessary.”
So we see that there is a link between the military conditions of the 
Volunteer Army — undisciplined, relying on plunder for upkeep — and 
its military objective — the war against the Bolsheviks. The “kikes” 
provided the link. The objective, which would have not been easily 
achieved even if conditions had been better, was lost sight of. The 
ideology gave the Army a more reachable enemy: no longer the Red 
Army in its gray uniform, but the Jew in his gabardine. And it gave the 
Army “permission to go wild for three days.” Pogroms against Jews 
were the ideal solution, they were part of the war against the Bolsheviks. 
Furthermore, there was a guarantee that Russians, “our own,” would 
not be harmed, and would be happy to let themselves “be saved” only 
if they did not have to pay for it. “Our own” could be bought, at least 
their silence could.
The Volunteer Army and its Program  
on the Jewish Question
Things have their own logic, and logic underlying the ideology of the 
pogroms required them go deeper. A pogrom was a detail, but what was 
needed was a general rule, a system that would include the whole issue 
of the Jewish question. Because it was evident: if Jews were citizens with 
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equal rights, then pogroms would not have been permitted. Pogroms 
against Jews implied that laws did not apply to Jews. They would not 
be possible if Jews had equal rights, which would mean that they were 
“protected by law” like everyone else. This obstacle had to be swept out 
of the way.
Only one could be true: either equal rights or pogroms. The Volunteer 
Army had only one answer. We have already noted how Shulgin, in 
his article on “Terror Inquisition” links Bolshevism, equal rights, and 
pogroms. As Shulgin sees it, Bolshevism (in his opinion) means “ruining 
the country,” and is a Jewish plot to get their rights. Bolshevism permits 
Jews to get equal rights at any price. Pogroms, on the contrary, are 
Russia’s way to protect itself. That is why Russia wants to avoid the fate 
of equal rights for Jews. This leads to the conclusion that the only way to 
exalt Russia again is by preventing equal rights for Jews. 
Shulgin explores this idea in many articles. “There are,” he says, 
“decent Jews and evil Jews… Evil Jews are those who get involved 
in politics. Jews have shown that in politics they can only wreak 
devastating ruin, no more. We ask decent Jews to convince their sons 
and their brothers not to meddle in politics in Russia” (Kievlyanin No. 
63, 21 November/4 December 1919). 
We hear the same from Shulgin’s pupil, the infamous Savenko, 
and others. It is noteworthy that Shulgin does not believe that “decent 
Jews” will be wise enough to follow his advice. That is why he offers 
the regime a ready-made program to bring the Jews to their senses: 
“Jews must be forced out of every position where they might harm 
the Russian government, which is being reborn. There should be no 
Jewish officers, officials, or judges. There should be no Jews on city 
councils, and none in the zemstovs,49 and no mayors (Kievlyanin No. 41, 
25 October/7 November 1919). Not surprisingly it did not take long 
for the regime to carry out its leader’s program. It was done exactly as 
Shulgin advised. 
And in some cases it had even started before he made his suggestions. 
They began with Jewish officers, who were summarily expelled. When 
there were mobilizations, Jews were rejected. Those were the orders of 
the high command, General Mai-Mayevsky and others. In the petition 
that a Jewish delegation gave to General Denikin (at a meeting on 26 
49  Russian: rural councils.
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July/8 August 1919) we discover an interesting fact: “In Kharkiv there 
was a military unit of the Volunteer Army, half of whom were Jews. 
That unit was sent to fight with a mixed battalion near Zolochev, and 
fought well in the operation. But the very same day they pulled the Jews 
out of the battalion and sent them home until the next mobilization.” 
When the delegation pointed this out to General Denikin, he replied: “I 
warned General Mai-Mayevsky about this, but I knew that he couldn’t 
do anything else. I finally ordered that the Jewish officers be dismissed 
and held in reserve.” The reason was that the Army would not tolerate 
Jews. For General Denikin and the other generals this should not 
have prevented them from mobilizing Jewish soldiers. Because we 
already know from Shulgin’s program that danger lay only in Jewish 
officers — in the rights of Jews — and not in Jewish soldiers, the 
obligations of Jews. 
Then they expelled Jews from city councils. On 4/17 August, for 
example, Division General Schipner-Markevich gave his first order to the 
garrison in Cherkasy, which stated: “1. Kuban Cossacks took Cherkasy 
today, and the city is now part of the territory of unified, indivisible 
Russia. 2. I order that the city municipal administration assemble, as it 
was constituted before the Bolshevik overthrow, excluding Bolsheviks 
and Jews.”
General Osovsky did the same in Kremenchug, in his Order No. 1. 
The only difference here is that he orders not only the expulsion of Jews 
from the city municipal administration, but also from the City Hall, 
adding this explanation: “to calm down the population.” And the same 
was done in Niezhyn and elsewhere. 
Jews were barred from elections. Jews were crossed off electoral 
lists for the city hall in Bila-Tserkava and Kiev, following Shulgin’s 
program. This happened to the Jew Ladizhensky, a member of the 
Kiev city administration. The Governor of the province, Cherniavsky, 
was given the list to certify. Most of them were members of the 
administration, among them Ladizhensky (an engineer experienced in 
city management). The Governor did not want to certify Ladizhensky, 
and the other candidates, Christians, would not give in. 
A compromise was reached over this conflict: Ladizhensky 
would pretend that he was sick, and therefore unable to serve in the 
administration. A short time later Ladizhensky was permitted to serve. 
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The city council wrote up the protocol and presented it to Cherniavsky, 
who had the right not to certify it within a certain time period. But 
he did not do so, from which it was concluded that by his inaction he 
was certifying Ladizhensky in the council. But General Dragomirov 
intervened unexpectedly, issuing this order: “I hereby remove 
Ladizhensky from his position as a member of the council” (15/18 
October 1919).
This high-level commander, whose assignment it was to supervise 
all the civilian and military activities in one third of Ukraine, still had 
the time and sufficient interest to look into small-time Jewish affairs. 
In one instance four Jewish workers were expelled from the printing 
office at headquarters because they were Jewish. The central bureau 
of the professional unions pointed out to the commander that there 
was absolutely no reason to fire them. To which General Dragomirov 
responded sharply to the bureau in a rage, warning them that if they 
ever showed such audacity again, he would bring them before a military 
tribunal (7/20 November 1919).
And so they put Shulgin’s plan into effect. They systematically 
reduced the Jews to the same status of slaves without rights that they 
had had in the time of Nikolai. First trample them, then put them in 
chains. Jews were being degraded even more in the eyes of “the dregs.” 
The lower the Jews fell, the better “the dregs” felt about themselves. 
The civil rights of citizens did not apply to Jews. Jews were aliens. 
Especially in light of the atrocities of the Volunteer Army, it didn’t 
take much to see that the laws of common decency did not apply to 
Jews. The Jews were left on their own. And that kind of abandonment 
was morally and politically rooted in their lack of civil rights. It was 
an old story that had been repeated many times in many countries. 
There was a chain of assumptions and a conclusion: (1) To an army “of 
low character” and violent “dregs” (2) which maintains itself “in the 
manner of Wallenstein,” that is, from plunder and violence (3) is given 
the objective of waging war against Bolshevism, that is, the kikes” (the 
terms “kikes” and Bolsheviks are interchangeable), and these Jews 
are not protected by the law — and are excluded from civil rights 
and public life (4) so as to save Russia and the Orthodox Church. (5) 
Therefore only one conclusion can be drawn: “Murder the Jews and 
save Russia!”
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The Struggle Against Pogroms
Was there no effort at all to stop the pogroms? On paper, why certainly, of 
course! The military commanders in the towns can show you a mountain 
of orders that forbid harming peaceful civilians, including Jews. And they 
rant that anyone who violates the order will be subject to the harshest 
laws of war and will be shot on the spot. But if you look closely at the 
actual practice of the war, you will see what that order is really worth. We 
have already noted that officers (including those of high rank) took part 
in the pogroms alongside their soldiers and Cossacks. And often it was 
the officers themselves who started them. Even those officers who did 
not actually participate with their own hands still shared in the plunder. 
Not to mention the “contributions” that they extorted. Commanders and 
garrison chiefs, who were supposed to stop the pogroms, were constantly 
extorting “contributions” to “uphold order,” meaning to issue orders. 
What more do we need than Sokolov’s account about “heavy capital” 
and a “gigantic train loaded with merchandise and other goods,” which 
he saw in Rostov with “a popular military leader?”
Could the military commanders on the ground really have stopped 
the pogroms, when they knew that that Army did not take them 
seriously, and when they themselves participated? There can be no 
doubt. When you weigh the many orders that were not obeyed, that is 
evidence, too. The Cossacks got the message. It suffices to consider the 
case of stopping a pogrom in one town, and the answer becomes quite 
clear. On 4/17 August 1919, the Volunteer Army took Cherkasy, and it 
launched a pogrom that very day, which lasted 3 days and took the lives 
of 150 people and many more who were wounded and raped, not to 
mention plundered. 
The command took note of the pogrom only on 6/19 August, the 
third day. The commander, centurion Golovk, issued Order no. 3. It 
mentions pogroms, among other things: “Point 4. I have received many 
complaints that Cossacks are supposedly plundering, but it turns out 
that in reality, it is the local people who are plundering. I am furious, 
and anyone who is caught red-handed will be shot without mercy.” 
This, then, officially absolved the Cossacks and their officers of any 
responsibility, which is to say the very ones who had perpetrated 
the pogrom, and they could continue what they were doing without 
78 The Pogroms in Ukraine, 1918–19
interference. After the third day (the infamous “3 days”) the violence 
subsided, followed by a “quiet pogrom.” 
Violence and plundering continued. Jewish homes were ransacked, 
supposedly in the search for weapons. The military command again 
commented on the pogrom, but now in a patient tone. The new 
commander in town, lieutenant Vasilyev, issues an order (No. 1, 8/21 
August) which states, among other things: “Point 4. Searching houses 
at will (without an order) are strictly forbidden. Whoever disobeys this 
order will be treated as a robber. Point 5. I ask you to help the chief of 
the city police to stop robbers and other criminals. They (the criminals) 
should be arrested and brought to me.” Clearly that order had no more 
of an impact than the first two, because the very next day the command 
again addressed the same issue. 
This time it was the garrison chief, Captain Yakovlev, but he does 
not accuse the criminals, and instead chastises and blames the victims. 
His order states: “I have already ordered the residents to surrender 
their weapons, their valuable clothes, and their valuable things. And 
it should have been done all at the same time… Instead they hid their 
weapons and their (valuable) things, and because of that we are forced 
to search the houses (Order no. 2 to the Cherkasy garrison, dated 9/22 
August).” After they so obviously whitewashed “those who had done 
the searches,” that is to say those who had committed the pogroms, it 
was a signal to everyone that they were permitted to do anything they 
wished. And they did, to such an extent that in a few days the authorities 
again had to take up the pen. 
The new garrison chief, Captain Shimkevich, had to speak severely. 
His announcement said: “The Volunteer Army has routed the Bolsheviks, 
those evil plunderers and rapists, and has brought peace and security to 
all citizens alike, whatever their nationality, but I have heard that in a few 
parts of the city there have been attacks and robberies… I, the garrison 
chief of Cherkasy, wish to root out such Bolshevik activities, and I am 
warning the population that I am taking the most severe measures to 
protect the personal security and possessions of the citizenry. Those who 
are caught red-handed will be shot without mercy.” (Announcement 
dated 13/16 August).
These “severe” words and “measures” must have frightened no one, 
because the “quiet pogrom” did not stop, and a new commander of the 
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guard, Colonel Christoforov, had to start all over. Apparently he could 
not count on his own authority, because he immediately looked for help 
from a higher rank, General Slashchev, the supreme commander over 
the entire region, whose proclamation dealt primarily with the peasant 
revolts and specifically with Makhno’s gangs. Here is what it said: “I 
have been given the responsibility to allow the people the possibility to 
live peacefully, and I will do it. I will also take responsibility for violence 
against peaceful residents… I take full responsibility.” (Order no. 19, 
dated 30 October/12 November 1919)
The General’s wrath was of no use either. In any case it was almost 
all over. The Volunteer Army was starting to retreat along the whole 
front, and mass plundering and slaughters began again. The same 
Christoforov had to bring it up again a month later (for the umpteenth 
time), with the threat to “shoot on the spot.” It is clear from his order 
that mass plunder was occurring again, especially against the Jewish 
residents, supposedly “by people disguised in the uniform of the 
Volunteer Army. I am convinced that these plunderers are not actually 
members of the Army… They are undoubtedly criminals who have 
put on the uniform in order to incriminate the honorable fighters of 
the Volunteer Army. Therefore I order… shooting on the spot without 
mercy.” (Order no. 20, dated 27 November/10 December 1919).
Christoforov also promises that he will “publicly report the names 
of all those who are shot.” But no one ever has ever seen such a report. 
That is not surprising, considering the real purpose of the order: 
to whitewash those who were really guilty, the Cossacks and their 
officers, while throwing the blame onto the Bolsheviks, meaning, in the 
Volunteer Army context, the Jews themselves. We have already noted 
the use of this approach in Niezhyn (see above) and elsewhere.
Looking at these orders that repeat the same thing, with little 
variation, in different towns, we cannot avoid concluding that the 
military command in each place issued those orders with these 
aims: 1. Whitewash those who were actually guilty, the Army, while 
besmirching the Bolsheviks 2. Keep up appearances for the sake of the 
supreme commanders 3. Humor the Jews to obtain “contributions.” 
That was how the local military stopped pogroms. But what were the 
upper echelons doing? They certainly understood what Shulgin had 
predicted, that “such an army would not last long.” They must have 
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grasped that and they must have understood that pogroms weakened 
the victimizers no less than the victims. For that reason they had to curb 
the pogroms, for the sake of the Army itself. The survival of the Army 
was in danger.
But first we must ascertain whether they knew about them and what 
they knew. We have already noted that a Jewish delegation informed 
Denikin about the pogroms on 26 July (August 8). To which Denikin 
replied: “I know more about these excesses than you.” 
A bit earlier, on July 20 (2 August), Denikin — as well as his whole 
regime — had been informed of the pogroms by a resolution of the 
regional conference of the People’s Socialist Party in Rostov-on-Don. 
On 13/26 September the Ukrainian committee of the Union for the 
Regeneration of Russia sent Denikin a detailed report on the pogroms and 
what needed to be done to stop them, with much documentary material. 
On the 3rd of October, three organizations, the National Center, the 
Union for the Regeneration of Russia, and the Union for the National 
Unification of Russia (which were the pillars of Denikin’s advisory 
Special Council) sent Denikin an outraged memorandum on the 
pogroms. 
At the end of October Professor Odinets, chairman of the Kiev 
Committee of the Union for the Regeneration of Russia, himself spoke 
to Denikin about it. In addition, the other high commanders — generals 
like Dragomirov, Mai-Mayevsky, Bredov, etc., were well-informed 
of the pogroms by delegations, memoranda, complaints by private 
individuals, etc. In short, the highest echelons were perfectly well aware 
of what was happening.
Strictly speaking, we cannot say that they did nothing at all 
about it. They issued orders forbidding pogroms. But these official 
prohibitions had absolutely no effect. Worse, they were mocked. In 
Kiev, for example, there was an assistant police commissioner named 
Skorokhod in Podol who, it appears, took seriously Bredov’s order of 
5/18 October (mentioned above). Here is his account of this strange 
story of what occurred: On 5/18 October he caught criminals (four 
armed soldiers) red-handed as they were attacking Eliezer Moshinsky’s 
home at Vekhny-Val No. 23. He managed to arrest three of them 
with eyewitnesses. But he could not investigate the matter further, 
because disturbing news came that “high superiors” of their military 
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detachment were on their way to help out their pals who had been 
arrested. So Skorokhod turned over the three men with their stolen 
goods to the commandant. He soon learned that the men had been 
released immediately. Skorokhod complained that in such situations 
the local guard (the police) was totally incapable of stopping armed 
attacks by military units, which were occurring on a massive scale. He 
ends his report this way: “The sub-commandant told me secretly, as 
a friendly warning, that it would go badly for policemen who tried to 
arrest soldiers, and he counseled me not to do it again. (Report of the 
assistant police commissioner dated 6/19 October).50 
And that was how it went in Kiev right in front of General 
Bredov’s eyes. What, then, could we expect of the provinces, where 
the commanders, the garrison chiefs, etc., often led the pogroms 
themselves, or at best shared the plunder with the Cossacks? There they 
didn’t merely intimidate the police; they punished them. For example in 
Pryluk the police arrested four soldiers in the pogrom. The commander 
of the Semyonov regiment came, gave the police chief a good slapping, 
and released the soldiers along with their plunder. Is it any surprise that 
the “struggle” against the pogroms had absolutely no effect?
Much would have been required for that effort to have been 
successful, especially considering the way the Volunteer Army supplied 
itself. Above all, the highest commanders needed to have really been 
sincere and serious about it. The Cossacks and the officers needed to 
have been convinced that the military leaders fundamentally considered 
pogroms to be shameful, totally intolerable, and in no way part of their 
mission and purpose. But for the military leaders to really have been 
serious, they would have had to — at the very least — considered Jews 
as citizens with equal rights. They would have to think of Jews as an 
integral part of the population; who were no worse than others; who 
could just as well have Bolsheviks among them (since the Volunteer 
Army considered Bolsheviks to be criminals); and who bore no collective 
guilt for the actions of the Bolshevik Army.
But could the highest commanders think of Jews that way? Not at 
all! Because they were the very same Tsarist generals who were steeped 
in the hatred of Jews and who rejected them as equal citizens. For four 
50  A similar report was received from Chuvenko, police commissioner in Region Two 
of Bila-Tserkava [note by the author].
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years, during the World War, they had continuously accused the Jews 
as traitors and spies. It was on their orders that hundreds of Jews had 
been falsely charged with espionage, as in the trial of Hershonovich in 
Mariiampil, and in the slander of Jews in the village of Kuzhi (Kovno 
province), etc. It was on their orders that hundreds of thousands of 
Jews were banished from the area of the front line — and given 24 
hours to leave — with a cruelty such as they never showed towards the 
citizens of the enemy, during the expulsion from Kovno and Suvalka 
provinces on 5 May 1915. We have seen that their treatment of the Jews 
had not changed. 
Even their way of making Jews “respectable” remained the same: 
At the start of the World War the Tsarist generals had seized Jewish 
hostages in Poland and Lithuania, and now they did the same in 
Ukraine under Denikin’s flag, in Valk on June 18–19 (July 1–2), 1919. 
Then they methodically fired all the Jews from government and social 
jobs. They set up a regime in which Jews had no civil rights and were 
denigrated. They expelled Jewish officers from their Army, as well as 
doctors (as in Kiev). They expelled Jews from the city governments, 
even from committees on wartime industrial production. They fired 
Jewish workers from all government enterprises. It was the highest 
echelons, the leaders at the top, who did all that. What impression, then, 
would that have made on the regular officers and Cossacks, especially 
since it was in their own personal interest that Jews be equated with 
“Bolsheviks” and “the enemies of Russia.” Did the soldier-criminals in 
Kiev, for example, really believe that General Bredov was serious with 
his order of 5/18 October against pogroms, when in that very order he 
made it clear that the Jews were “the defeated enemy,” and they should 
be treated “with mercy?”
The most essential element was missing: sincerity! The attitude of 
the soldier-criminals towards the Jews was the same as that of those 
who should have stopped them. The generals, who are generally poor 
diplomats, could not even disguise the real reason for their sham 
campaign against pogroms which was: “What will the world say? What 
will foreign countries say? We have the Entente on our side, which 
sends us weapons and finances us, and watches over our relations with 
countries on our borders, in a very complicated international situation. 
What will they say about our pogroms?” 
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That was the overriding concern of many generals, Shkuro, Bredov, 
etc., when they spoke against pogroms. The dictatorship — Denikin 
himself — saw it that way too. The Jewish delegation of 26 July/8 August 
pleaded with him to issue a public proclamation against pogroms, 
and about the Jewish question in general and cited Admiral Kolchak’s 
proclamation in Siberia. To which he replied: “There are Americans 
there (in Siberia)! I will make a proclamation for all the rest.” What will 
our friends say? — that was the main issue for the generals, who, since it 
was a military dictatorship, also had to practice diplomacy. They had to 
welcome an English general, Briggs, and an American general, Jadwin 
(from the Morgenthau Commission),51 and they might have to give 
them an accounting, too. We have already seen from K. N. Sokolov that 
liberal declarations were staged “for export.” 
The Cossacks and their officers understood very clearly the underlying 
spirit of their leaders’ “strict orders,” so they paid no attention and just 
did as they wished. Let their “superiors” deal with their “friends” as 
best they could. One method could always be counted on: convince 
the “friends” that all Jews were Bolsheviks. That was why Osvag was 
needed, to peddle stories about “Jewish shooting in Novy-Mglyn, Kiev, 
etc.; about Jewish commissars (when needed, they could turn the Jewish 
“bourgeois” into commissars, as in Yuzovka; and about Red Legions of 
Jews (who were nowhere to be found with guns in their hands, to show 
the “friends”). Their “friends” believed them, or pretended to…
And since the struggle against pogroms was fundamentally lacking 
in sincerity, the reaction to those who perpetrated them was extremely 
mild. During the entire period of eight months, we know of only a single 
case when General Mai-Mayevsky fired another general, Khazov, the 
commander of the Second Terek Plastun Brigade, because his brigadiers 
had destroyed Jewish shops in Smila (Order no. 325, dated 11/24 
August). That was the official reason. But it is obvious that General Mai-
Mayekovsky did not greatly lament the Brigade’s atrocities, because 
they had already previously devastated Cherkasy, and in Smila they 
dishonored themselves even worse, with murders and the mass rape 
of Jewish women. Mai-Mayevsky’s mild punishment did not in the 
51  Brigadier General Edgar Jadwin, member of the Henry Morgenthau Commission, 
sent by the United States to research the situation in Poland from July to September 
1919. Its report was published in the New York Times.
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least deter their pogrom activities. They went on to destroy the Jewish 
communities in Korsun and Bila-Tserkava, and they perpetrated the 
wholesale slaughter in Fastiv, with Commander Belogortsev in the 
lead, which was the worst of the pogroms of the Volunteer Army. In the 
course of three days they butchered and burned 600 Jews, and burned 
down the vast majority of Jewish homes and shops, on 9/22–12/15 
September 1919.
There was also a case where General Dragomirov put some officers 
on trial who had the nerve to be plundering after the “three legal days” 
of pogrom in Kiev on 17/20 October. There was another case — more of 
a comedy — of a trial of soldier-criminals in Tomashpil. In September 
1919 Tomashpil was overrun by the Second Kuban Labinsk Cavalry 
Regiment, which launched a pogrom lasting five days straight. A 
delegation of two Christians traveled to Vafniarka, which was the 
nearest train station, and complained to General Rozenshild von 
Paulin. The general sent a field court to Tomashpil. When they arrived, 
the commander of the Labinsk Regiment summoned some Jews, and 
ordered them to write a letter attesting that his regiment had done no 
wrong to the Jews. 
The head of the field court himself privately advised them not 
to accuse the Volunteer Army harshly, and in general to be very 
cautious about their testimony. On the day that the Jews were going 
to testify before the court, the Cossacks started shooting in the streets, 
and screaming, “Kikes, go home! Or we’ll murder you!” Most of the 
witnesses and victims ran away. Only a small group of 15–20 people 
came to the trial. After the trial, the chairman privately told the Jews that 
some Cossack criminals had been sentenced to death. But the executions 
would be carried out in Vafniarka, not in Tomashpil, because it would 
make the regiment look bad. 
Whether there had actually been such a sentence, and whether the 
sentence had been carried out, could not be officially confirmed. But the 
residents of Tomashpil were able to witness this scene: The court wanted 
to inspect the Cossack wagons, which were overflowing with goods 
that had been plundered from the Jews. With the very first wagon, the 
Cossacks began shooting from the courtyards and the streets nearby. 
The court ran away, and was not seen again near the wagons. Later, 
when the Labinsk Regiment retreated before the Bolsheviks, they got 
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even with the Jews on 20–21 February (4–5 March) and perpetrated a 
pogrom in which they murdered many people.
But those were rare, unusual cases. As a rule the soldier-criminals 
never had to deal with accusations or face any punishment. K. N. 
Sokolov confirms this when he mentions “the open plundering at the 
front.” He says, “The knowledge that there would be no punishment, 
turned loose human beings — often decent, peaceful — whom months 
of bloody warfare had turned into wild beasts.” We gradually struggled 
against this evil. Once in a while plunderers in military uniform were 
sentenced to death. But those were very rare exceptions. As a rule they 
plundered the residents systematically without interference. Soldiers of 
every rank and position did it (p. 193). Sokolov hides the fact that “the 
residents” in towns and villages were almost always Jews. As a rule 
the struggle against pogroms consisted only of orders, proclamations, 
and persuasion. But the more these sermons against pogroms were 
issued, the less impact they had on the very people who were supposed 
to learn their lesson. They were practical people, not political, and 
experience had taught them that though the orders might seem severe, 
the commanders were mild, and you could count on them!
There were those who thought that an order from General Denikin, 
the dictator himself, would help. A Jewish delegation asked him to do it 
on 26 July (8 August). Similarly the Union for the Regeneration of Russia 
sent Denikin a memorandum on the pogroms on 13/26 September. So 
did three organizations (the Union for the Regeneration of Russia, the 
National Center, and the Union for the National Unification of Russia) in 
their desperate memorandum of 3 October. General Denikin hesitated 
for a long time, and finally on 25 September (8 October) he issued 
an order only to the military commander of the Kiev region: “I have 
had news that the Army is committing acts of violence against Jews. 
I order that energetic measures be taken to stop such acts. The guilty 
shall be punished harshly” (published in Kiev newspapers). “I have had 
news” — thus said General Denikin two months after he had been told 
of pogroms by the Jewish delegation and after he himself had told that 
delegation, “I know more about these excesses than you.” 
How far down the Army did Denikin’s three sentences reach? 
And how much of an effect did they have? The clearest answer to that 
question lies in the continuing pogroms that did not stop for a single 
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day, and especially the pogrom of 17/20 October in Kiev itself (which 
until then had been peaceful), which was perpetrated right in front of 
the highest military and civilian authorities. The Union for the National 
Unification of Russia independently, and also together with the other 
two organizations, let Denikin know that pogroms were “a terrible blow 
to our cause before the world opinion of the Allied countries,” which 
was an approach that should have been effective. They pointed out that 
in addition to his order, it was also necessary 1) to appoint a high-level 
investigative commission and 2) bring the criminals to justice. 
Could the dictator Denikin have carried out such a campaign against 
pogroms if he had even wanted to? Denikin gave the answer to that 
question in another context, when he met with the Jewish delegation 
on 26 July (August 8). They had told him that he had wrought “a 
miracle” by creating such an army, and asked him to issue an order 
against pogroms. It would surely be obeyed. To which Denikin replied, 
“Thank God that they obey my battle commands. But it is not possible 
to expect more under the present circumstances and the morale of the 
Army.” Clearly the dictator knew his Army better than his officers. 
Having unleashed “the dregs,” “the wild beast,” nothing he did 
would be effective now. And the more that “dregs” were “liberating 
Russia,” i.e. the more they “liberated” Jews of the burden of their lives 
and possessions and human dignity, the less effective he became. The 
dregs wished to lead, and not be led. 
But it must be said that there had been a time when General Denikin 
understood how serious a situation the bloodbath of pogroms was for 
the Army itself, a threat to itself. At that time he had shown courage 
to say it to the Army, and he had found the right words to do it: “Not 
long ago we were in Oriol. But a series of mistakes has driven us back to 
Kuban. Now, on the eve of a determined assault, we must be victorious. 
Let everyone remember that one of the reasons why our front broke 
down, and our rear fell into indiscipline — was the murders and the 
plundering… If our commanders do not immediately root out this 
evil, our new attack will be for naught. I command that the harshest 
measures be taken, including the death penalty, against all those who 
commit murder and plunder, and against those who hide them from the 
higher superiors, which they are not.”
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But it was too late, after all that had already happened! He gave that 
command on 23 January 1920 in the village of Tikhoretsk in the death 
throes of the Volunteer Army. General Denikin had overestimated his 
chances. The “Plunder Army,” as the Volunteer Army was called in 
Ukraine, was broken and totally undisciplined. But it did manage to 
take back Rostov again for two days, February 7–8, but it was forced to 
retreat. At the end of the month its remnants were driven back to the sea. 
Whatever one may think of the “measures” against pogroms taken 
by the high command of the Volunteer Army, there remains one 
significant detail which cannot be altered or explained away. Petliura’s 
military units also committed pogroms, including those by big and little 
“Atamans” (officers), and their attempts to stop the pogroms were no 
better than that of the Volunteers. But there was one anomaly: a single 
investigative commission in a single town: Zhitomir. The Volunteer 
Army did not even have that much. Yes, there was an investigation to 
be sure, not into the pogroms, but into “Jewish shooting,” by Senator 
Gulayev’s commission in Kiev. They censored the respectable press. For 
example, on 23 September (October 6) 1919, Chernovitz, the editor of the 
Jewish newspaper, Di velt52 was notified that “no articles about pogroms 
or assaults committed by people in military uniform shall be permitted 
to be published.” And the Volunteer Army itself hid its atrocities from 
the world, certain that they would remain unnoticed. Who knows what 
more horrifying things would have come to light?
52  Yiddish: The World.

List of Jewish Communities That 
Were Destroyed
1. Avdeyevka, Yekaterinoslav province
2. Ignatovka, Kiev province
3. Ovukhov, Kiev province
4. Olshanitsa, Kiev province
5. Okhrimova, Kiev province
6. Ostior, Chernihiv province
7. Orlovets, Kiev province
8. Badievka, Podolia province
9. Baturin, Chernihiv province
10. Bobrovytsia, Chernihiv province
11. Bogodukhov, Kharkiv province
12. Bohuslav, Kiev province
13. Borzna, Chernihiv province
14. Boryspil, Poltava province 
15. Boyarka, Kiev province
16. Beybusy (a village), Kiev province
17. Bila-Tserkava, Kiev province 
18. Belilovka, Kiev province
19. Gogolevo, Chernihiv province
20. Golovenka (a village), Chernihiv province 
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21. Germanovka, Kiev province
22. Grebionka, Poltava province 
23. Dzhurin, Poltava province 
24. Dymer, Kiev province 
25. Dremalovka, Chernihiv province 
26. Hostomel, Kiev province 
27. Horodyshche, Kiev province 
28. Valk, Kharkiv province 
29. Vasilkov, Kiev province 
30. Volchansk, Kharkiv province 
31. Verbka, Podolia province
32. Zamekhov, Podolia province
33. Zolotonosh, Kiev province 
34. Tagancha, Kiev province
35. Talne, Kiev province 
36. Tarashch, Kiev province 
37. Tomashpil, Podolia province 
38. Tetiiv, Kiev province 
39. Trostyanets, Podolia province 
40. Triles (Jewish agricultural settlement near Fastiv), Kiev province 
41. Tripoli, Kiev province 
42. Chervlenska, (a Jewish agricultural settlement near Fastiv), 
Kiev province 
43. Chernihiv
44. Cherkasy, Kiev province 
45. Yablonova, Poltava province 
46. Yampol, Podolia province 
47. Yanovka, Kiev province 
48. Yaruha, Podolia province 
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49. Yenakiev, Yekaterinoslav province 
50. Yekaterinoslav
51. Kharkiv
52. Khodorkov, Kiev province
53. Khorol, Poltava province
54. Lozovaya, Yekaterinoslav province
55. Luchinets, Podolia province
56. Makarov, Kiev province
57. Mohilev-Podolsk province
58. Monastyryshche, Kiev province 
59. Moshny, Kiev province 
60. Miaskova, Podolia province 
61. Mykhailivka, Yekaterinoslav province 
62. Mezhyrich, Kiev province 
63. Novo-Arkhangelsk, Kherson province 
64. Novy-Malyn, Chernihiv province 
65. Nosivka, Chernihiv province 
66. Niezhyn, Chernihiv province 
67. Savaran, Podolia province 
68. Sviatashin, Kiev province 
69. Sinelnikov, Yekaterinoslav province
70. Smila, Kiev province 
71. Stavishche, Kiev province 
72. Stepanets, Kiev province 
73. Pavoloch, Kiev province 
74. Pohrebyshche, Kiev province
75. Potoki (a village), Kiev province 
76. Poltava, Kiev province 
77. Popelna, Kiev province 
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78. Pushcha-Voditsa, Kiev province 
79. Piatigorya, Kiev province 
80. Pryluk, Poltava province 
81. Fastiv, Kiev province
82. Kaharlik, Kiev province 
83. Kalius, Podolia province
84. Kamenskoya, near Yekaterinoslav
85. Kamenka, Kiev province 
86. Kobishch, Chernihiv province 
87. Kozin, Kiev province 
88. Kolibalod, Kherson province
89. Koldubitska (a Jewish agricultural settlement near Fastiv), 
Kiev province 
90. Kaniv, Kiev province 
91. Konotop, Chernihiv province 
92. Kornin, Kiev province
93. Korsun, Kiev province
94. Kupiansk, Kharkiv province 
95. Kurilovtsy, Podolia province 
96. Kiev 
97. Krivoye-Ozero, Podolia province
98. Kremenchug, Poltava province 
99. Rakitna, Kiev province 
100. Rozhev (an agricultural settlement), Kiev province 
101. Rossovo, Kiev province 
102. Ryzhanovka, Kiev province
103. Rikun (a Jewish agricultural settlement), Kiev province
104. Shargorod, Podolia province
105. Shibenoya (a village), Kiev province
Sources
This book is based on the documents in the Archives of the Editorial 
Board for the Collection and Investigation of Materials Concerning 
the Pogroms in Ukraine, and in general these materials fall into two 
categories: 
I. The Board’s own documents: 
1. Special investigations that the Board itself sponsored by sending 
people to certain locations. Although Kiev was cut off from the 
rest of the province, and it was dangerous to travel on the trains, 
especially for Jews, the Board managed to investigate Boyarka, 
Fastiv, and to some extent the Jewish agricultural community 
of Koldubitsk-Obraztsova, near Fastiv.
2. Eyewitness testimony from observers and victims. This 
comprised the bulk of the documentation. We interviewed 
people on site and homeless people who had fled to Kiev. We 
used a certain format and were careful in choosing subjects. 
The testimony was recorded using the person’s own words. 
We tried to interview as many people as possible from the 
same location, people from different classes, so that there 
would be an impartial verification of the testimony. 
3. Reports from the Board’s own correspondents.
4. Official reports (in copies) from government officials.
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5. Complaints and appeals by victims to the regime.
6. Documents: proclamations, commands, orders, etc. from the 
regime, social organizations, etc.
7. Lists of the names of those who had been murdered.
8. Newspaper materials.
II. Documentation from other organizations and 
institutions that the Board has in its archives  
(mostly copies). The most important among these are 
materials are:
A. From the Russian Red Cross (specifically the Relief Committee 
for Victims of Pogroms of the Russian Red Cross in Kiev). The 
Red Cross worked on behalf of pogrom victims, sent people 
to pogrom areas, kept correspondents there, and had an 
information office in Kiev to collect documentation. The most 
significant among those materials were:
1. Reports from those fully-authorized to do relief work on 
site. The Red Cross also had: 2. Testimonies of victims and 
witnesses, 3. Documents, 4. Lists of those who had been 
murdered.
B. Reports from the Central Jewish Committee for the Assistance 
of Pogroms (in Kiev), especially the Committee’s Legal Office. 
This office gathered very important documents, especially the 
Kiev pogrom (eyewitness testimony). There were also:
1. Reports from fully-authorized local committees and 
correspondents, 2. Testimonies of victims, 3. Documents, 
4. Complaints and petitions by victims to the authorities, 
5. Memoranda from the Committee itself to the authorities 
and other institutions.
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C. Reports from Jewish communities
a.  Kharkiv, especially pogroms in Kharkiv province and 
massacres on the railroads.
1. Testimonies of victims. 
2. Hostages in Valk.
3. The discussion between the Jewish delegation and 
General Denikin of 26 July (8 August) 1919, and the 
memorandum that the delegation delivered to Denikin.
b.  Kiev
1. Testimonies of victims.
2. Various memoranda.
c.  From the League to Combat Anti-Semitism (Kiev). These 
are mostly reports to the Prosecutor in the Court concerning 
plundering and massacres against Jews in Kiev.
d. From various organizations
1. From the Union for the Regeneration of Russia 
(copies of memoranda to General Denikin and General 
Bredov, with detailed information on the pogroms.
2. From the organization Poalei-Zion (reports, 
testimonies).
3. Various others.
On the worst pogroms, the Editorial Board and other 
institutions independently gathered parallel materials, 
on their own. On those pogroms there are reports both 
from correspondents and eyewitnesses.
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